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I.  INTRODUCTION 
To maintain legitimacy and stability, a government must have access to a reliable 
source of revenue.  Taxes are the lifeblood that sustains a government.  They fund 
student loans, provide equipment for the men and women serving in our military, 
and maintain our highways.  All these things develop and protect our society.  As far 
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back as 1931, the United States Supreme Court has enforced the principle that the 
executive branch of the federal government must be unimpaired in its ability to 
collect taxes owed; otherwise, the government could be undermined by citizens who 
attempt to delay or evade their obligation to pay taxes.1   
Taxpayers have always been permitted, of course, to dispute the amount of their 
liability; however, until recently, taxpayers had little opportunity to dispute the 
method employed by the IRS to collect an assessed tax.  In 1998, Congress enacted 
the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA of 1998), 
which represents a dramatic departure from this principle.2  Among its provisions the 
RRA of 1998 provided that taxpayers may demand a hearing before the IRS as to the 
proposed collection method and may also suggest alternatives, such as installment 
agreements or offers-in-compromise.  A dissatisfied taxpayer could then appeal the 
IRS’s determination on the matter either to the United States Tax Court or the 
federal district court, jurisdiction depending on the type of tax involved.3   
Unfortunately, these collection due process statutory provisions are short on 
details, and the IRS and the courts have struggled to create procedures that comport 
with the spirit of the law within the confines of their respective authorities.  The 
United States Tax Court is an Article I court Congress created to provide taxpayers 
with a forum to protest certain alleged tax deficiencies prior to their payment.  The 
Tax Court has been uncomfortable with its new appellate role and has tried to create 
a judicial review process by analogizing collection due process appeals to the Tax 
Court’s deficiency procedures.  However, when the Tax Court hears deficiency 
cases, it acts as a trial court and hears the matter de novo.  When the Tax Court hears 
collection due process appeals, it acts as an appellate court reviewing agency action 
to determine its propriety—an entirely different role and process from deficiency 
cases. 
The district courts turned to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and 
traditional administrative law jurisprudence to fill in the gaps Congress left in the 
enabling legislation.4  The Tax Court did not.  As a result, the two courts applied 
different review standards and different rules regarding evidence the courts would 
consider during the appeal.5  Therefore, despite the fact that the same enabling 
                                                          
 
1
 See Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931). 
 
2
 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
§ 3401, 112 Stat. 685, 747-50.   
 
3
 When first enacted, the RRA of 1998 split jurisdiction for collection due process 
appeals between the United States Tax Court and the federal district courts.  In 2006, 
Congress amended the law and vested the United States Tax Court with exclusive jurisdiction.  
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 855(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1019 (codified 
as amended at I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1) (2006)) (providing exclusive jurisdiction in the United 
States Tax Court for all collection due process appeals regardless of which court had 
jurisdiction over the underlying tax liability). 
 
4
 See, e.g., Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144 (1st Cir. 2005); Living Care Alternatives 
of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2005).  
 
5
 For example, as discussed infra note 43, both courts agreed that the standard should be 
abuse of discretion with regard to appeals that involved only the method the IRS proposed to 
use to collect the tax.  However, the Tax Court applied this standard in a different way from 
the district courts.  Also, the Tax Court did not confine itself to the record created during the 
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legislation empowered both courts to hear taxpayer appeals, the two courts 
conducted the appeals in significantly different ways that affected taxpayer rights.  
Although the Tax Court now has sole jurisdiction over collection due process 
appeals, its position remains problematic.  In the absence of legislation specifying 
how a court is to review agency action, the APA and traditional administrative law 
jurisprudence step into the breach and provide structure for the court’s review 
process.  As a result, participants in the process are assured of consistency and 
predictability regarding the review process, thus rendering the process fairer.  The 
Tax Court thwarts these expectations when it creates its own rules of procedure and 
evidence when acting as a reviewing court. 
Commentators have argued that the Tax Court should fill in the gaps in its 
statutory authority for collection due process appeals by turning to traditional 
administrative law jurisprudence, including the APA, which suggestion the Tax 
Court has resisted despite the fact that the federal district court did so.6  The majority 
of the Tax Court insists that it has never been subject to administrative law 
jurisprudence or the APA, nor could it be.  Most of the courts of appeals that have 
considered the issue have held that the Tax Court is bound by the APA and 
traditional administrative law jurisprudence when the Tax Court is acting as a 
reviewing court.  An exploration of the Tax Court’s and the APA’s history reveals 
that the Tax Court can be, and should be, subject to the APA and traditional 
administrative law jurisprudence when it acts as a reviewing court of agency action. 
Part II of the article explains how the collection due process administrative 
hearings and appeals therefrom operate and some of the difficulties that have arisen 
with these appeals.  Part III reviews the history of the Tax Court: how it began as a 
division of the Internal Revenue Service, became an independent agency, and then 
finally evolved into an Article I court.  Part IV explores how the APA came into 
being and the initial questions as to its potential application to the predecessors of 
the Tax Court.  Part V then considers and rejects the argument that the APA cannot 
apply to the Tax Court either because it is an Article I court or because it is a court of 
specialized, as opposed to general, jurisdiction.   
II.  COLLECTION DUE PROCESS HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
A.  The Internal Revenue Service’s Assessment and Collection Authority and 
Procedures  
1.  Assessment Authority and Procedures 
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to impose and collect taxes;7 
although Congress continues to be the authority that imposes taxes, the IRS actually 
                                                          
IRS level administrative appeal, but rather, permitted taxpayers to introduce new evidence 
during appeal.   
 
6
 See generally Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax 
Collection Decisions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429 (2008); Christine K. Lane, On-The-Record 
Review of CDP Determinations: An Examination of Policy Reasons Encouraging Judges to 
Stick to the Administrative Record, 6 FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REV. 149 (2007); Nick A. Zotos, 
Service Collection Abuse of Discretion: What is the Appropriate Standard of Review and 
Scope of the Record in Collection Due Process Appeals?, 62 TAX L. 223 (2008). 
 
7
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XVI. 
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has the authority to assess and collect taxes.  Generally, the Internal Revenue Service 
cannot commence collection proceedings until the tax has been assessed.8  
Assessment is the recording of the taxpayer’s liability in the office of the Secretary 
of the Treasury.9  The Internal Revenue Service is permitted to assess a tax after a 
taxpayer has filed a tax return showing a tax is owed10 or after the Tax Court has 
found the taxpayer is liable for a deficiency in income, estate, gift, and certain excise 
taxes.11  An assessment is the functional equivalent of a judgment against a 
taxpayer.12  
The Tax Court provides the taxpayer with an opportunity to receive pre-
assessment judicial review of some tax liabilities.13  In the case of income, estate, 
gift, and certain excise taxes, if the Internal Revenue Service determines that there is 
a deficiency in the tax shown on the return, or if no return was filed, the Internal 
Revenue Service must send the taxpayer a notice of deficiency.14  Within ninety days 
after the notice is mailed, the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a de 
novo re-determination of the deficiency.15  When conducting a deficiency hearing, 
the Tax Court is not confined to and does not rely on the administrative record 
compiled by the Internal Revenue Service in its dealings with the taxpayer.  Instead, 
the Tax Court acts as a trial court, hears the matter de novo, and determines for itself 
the taxpayer’s correct amount of tax due.  Although the Tax Court determines the 
taxpayer’s liability in a deficiency hearing, the Tax Court hears no evidence and 
makes no findings as to the manner in which the Internal Revenue Service will 
collect the tax if it is found to be owed.   
The Internal Revenue Service is prohibited from assessing or collecting the 
disputed tax during the ninety-day notice period; and if the taxpayer files a petition 
with the Tax Court, until the Tax Court’s decision is final.16  If the taxpayer fails to 
file a timely petition with the Tax Court, or if the Tax Court determines that there is 
a deficiency, the Internal Revenue Service may assess the tax and then begin 
                                                          
 
8
 I.R.C. §§ 6201, 6203, 6303, 6322 (2006).  The Internal Revenue Service can 
immediately assess a tax and commence collection if it determines that the tax is in jeopardy. 
 
9
 Id. § 6203. 
 
10
 Id. § 6201(c). 
 
11
 Id. § 6213. 
 
12
 Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm 
Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2004). 
 
13
 I.R.C. § 6214. 
 
14
 Internal Revenue Code section 6212 directs the Secretary to send the taxpayer a notice 
of deficiency.  Section 6211 defines deficiency.  A deficiency arises if the Internal Revenue 
Service believes that the taxpayer has understated, on the return, the correct amount of tax 
owed.  A deficiency does not include the situation where the taxpayer has indicated on the 
return that a certain amount of tax is owed, but simply fails to include the payment.  Id.      
 
15
 Section 6213(a) states that a taxpayer has ninety days to file a petition; if the taxpayer 
resides in another country, the time to file a petition is one hundred and fifty days.  Section 
6214 provides that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to re-determine the deficiency after a timely 
petition has been filed. 
 
16
 Id. § 6213(a). 
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collection proceedings.17  The Tax Court is the sole pre-assessment judicial forum 
available to taxpayers and, as noted above, is only available to contest income, 
estate, gift, and certain excise taxes.   
If the tax is one not subject to the Tax Court’s jurisdiction, such as a payroll tax 
or tax that the taxpayer has acknowledged on the return to be due (and merely has 
not paid), the Internal Revenue Service may immediately assess the tax and 
commence collection if the taxpayer fails to pay.18   
Other than as provided in I.R.C. sections 6320 and 6330, discussed below, the 
only relief from liability to which a taxpayer is entitled after assessment is rendered 
post-payment.   
If the taxpayer disputes that he is liable for the assessed tax, he nevertheless must 
first pay the tax and then file an administrative claim with the Internal Revenue 
Service for a refund.19  If the Internal Revenue Service denies the claim, the taxpayer 
may then file suit for refund in either the district court or the court of federal 
claims.20  However, the suit will address only the existence and the amount of the 
taxpayer’s liability; the suit will not address any methods the Internal Revenue 
Service may have employed to collect the tax.  Prior to enactment of the RRA of 
1998, taxpayers had little recourse with respect to IRS debt collection methods such 
as liens and levies.21 
                                                          
 
17
 I.R.C. § 6213(c) provides for assessment in the event the taxpayer fails to file a timely 
petition.  I.R.C. § 6215(a) provides that the tax may be assessed after the Tax Court’s 
determination of a deficiency becomes final as provided in I.R.C. § 7481.  However, I.R.C. § 
7482 permits the taxpayer to appeal the Tax Court’s decision to the United States Courts of 
Appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), and such 
review shall be to the same extent as decisions of district courts in civil actions tried without a 
jury.  The United States Supreme Court may review the appellate court’s decision upon 
certiorari. 
 
18
 Id. § 6201. 
 
19
 I.R.C. § 6511 provides that the taxpayer must file an administrative claim for refund 
three years from when the return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, 
whichever is later.  If the taxpayer did not file a return, he or she must file a claim for refund 
within two years from the time the tax was paid. 
 
20
 I.R.C. § 7422(a) states that no civil suit for refund may be commenced unless a taxpayer 
has first filed an administrative claim for refund.  I.R.C. § 6532(a) provides that the suit 
cannot be commenced until six months after the taxpayer has filed an administrative claim for 
refund, unless the Internal Revenue Service rejects the claim earlier.  After the Internal 
Revenue Service rejects the claim or six months elapse, the taxpayer must file suit within two 
years of that event. 
 
21
 The United States Supreme Court has held specifically that the collection of tax debt by 
means of a lien is constitutional.  United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 
721 (1985); see also Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931). 
The right of the United States to collect its internal revenue by summary 
administrative proceedings has long been settled.  Where . . . adequate opportunity is 
afforded for a later judicial determination of the legal rights, summary proceedings to 
secure prompt performance of pecuniary obligations to the government have been 
consistently sustained. 
Phillips, 283 U.S. at 595. 
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It is important to note that a taxpayer is supposed to get only one chance to 
dispute, in court, his tax liability.22  If the taxpayer avails himself of the Tax Court’s 
pre-assessment/pre-payment deficiency procedures and loses, the taxpayer cannot 
pay the tax and then file a suit for a refund.23  The Tax Court’s decision is res 
judicata as to the taxpayer’s liability.  If the tax was not one within the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction, or if the taxpayer chose not to file a petition with the Tax Court within 
the ninety-day period after receiving the notice of deficiency, the taxpayer must pay 
the tax and then avail himself of the refund procedures previously described. 
2.  Collection Authority and Procedures 
Historically, the Internal Revenue Service has enjoyed broad collection powers 
not subject to judicial review.24  The Internal Revenue Service is permitted to collect 
a delinquent tax by summary administrative proceedings and, with only a few 
exceptions,25 need not obtain a court order to take the taxpayer’s property.  These 
collection powers are buttressed by the Anti-Injunction statute,26 which prohibits a 
taxpayer from obtaining a court injunction against assessment or collection, subject 
to a few statutory exceptions contained therein.27 
                                                          
 
22
 The collection due process appeals have changed this and enabled some taxpayers to 
dispute their liability more than once in court.  See Diane L. Fahey, The Tax Court’s 
Jurisdiction over Due Process Collection Appeals: Is It Constitutional?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 
453, 491-92 (2003).   
 
23
 I.R.C. § 6512(a) (“If the Secretary has mailed to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency . . . 
and if the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court . . . no credit or refund . . . shall be 
allowed . . . and no suit . . . for the recovery of any part of the tax shall be instituted in any 
court . . . .”). 
 
24
 See Marilyn E. Phelan, A Summary of the Extensive Collection Powers of the Internal 
Revenue Service, 9 VA. TAX REV. 405 (1990).  Although Professor Phelan’s article predates 
the enactment of the RRA of 1998, much of her discussion of the Internal Revenue Service’s 
vast collection powers remains timely and is an extremely useful summary of the Internal 
Revenue Service’s summons, enforcement, and collection powers.  See also Camp, supra note 
12, at 20-21.  
 
25
 For example, the IRS must obtain a warrant in order to enter into private residences to 
seize assets (although a warrant is not required to seize property in public areas).  See G.M. 
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358 (1977). 
 
26
 I.R.C. § 7421(a) (“Except as provided in sections 6015(e), 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 
6225(b), 6246(b), 6330(e)(1), 6331(i), 6672(c), 6694(c), and 7426(a) and (b)(1), 7429(b), and 
7436 . . . no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be 
maintained in any court by any person . . . .”).  Id. 
 
27
 One of the exceptions was discussed above.  See supra text accompanying note 25.  A 
taxpayer may obtain an injunction if the Internal Revenue Service attempts to assess or collect 
a tax during the ninety-day period that the notice of deficiency is pending or while the Tax 
Court has jurisdiction over the deficiency proceeding.  In addition, the United States Supreme 
Court recognizes an exception to the Anti-Injunction statute and permits a taxpayer to obtain 
injunctive relief if the taxpayer can demonstrate two factors: (1) irreparable harm, and (2) 
certainty of success on the merits—a virtually impossible standard to satisfy.  See Bob Jones 
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737 (1974); Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 
370 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1962). 
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After assessing the tax, the Internal Revenue Service must send the taxpayer a 
notice informing him of the amount due and demanding payment.28  If the taxpayer 
fails to pay the tax within ten days, the Internal Revenue Service sends the taxpayer 
a notice of federal tax lien, which attaches to all of the taxpayer’s real and personal 
property.29  The Internal Revenue Service may then proceed and levy on the 
taxpayer’s property on which there is the federal tax lien30 except for certain exempt 
property.31  The taxpayer must be notified of the intent to levy at least thirty days 
prior to the levy,32 and this notice must advise the taxpayer, in “simple and 
nontechnical terms,” of the procedures relating to a levy and sale of property, 
available administrative appeals (including, most importantly, the right to a due 
process collection appeal), and alternatives that might prevent the levy.33 
3.  IRS Administrative Level Collection Due Process Hearings  
Unfortunately, I.R.C. section 6330 provides little guidance as to how the IRS 
should conduct the administrative hearing or how the Tax Court should conduct 
judicial review thereof.  After some initial confusion and debate, the courts 
determined that the hearings should be informal.34  At the administrative hearing, the 
taxpayer may raise any relevant issue pertaining to the unpaid tax or the proposed 
levy, including challenges to the appropriateness of the proposed collection action, 
offers of collection alternatives such as installment agreements, or offers in 
compromise.35  In addition to raising issues as to the proposed collection, the 
taxpayer may dispute the underlying tax liability itself if the taxpayer either did not 
receive the notice of deficiency or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute 
the tax.36 
                                                          
 
28
 See I.R.C. § 6303.  The notice and demand must be sent within sixty days of 
assessment.  Id. § 6303(a).  Although the Internal Revenue Service is obligated to send only 
one notice and demand, in fact, the Internal Revenue Service sends several computer-
generated notices before taking any further collection action.  See also MICHAEL J. SALTZMAN, 
IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 14.03[3] (rev. 2d ed. 2002).  
 
29
 Id. § 6321.  
 
30
 Id. § 6331(a). 
 
31
 I.R.C. § 6334 lists thirteen categories of items exempt from the levy.  They include such 
things as the taxpayer’s clothes, books, tools of trade, unemployment benefits, and disability 
benefits.  In addition, the Internal Revenue Service must obtain judicial permission to levy on 
the taxpayer’s personal residence.  
 
32
 Id. § 6331(d)(1)-(2). 
 
33
 Id. § 6331(d)(4)(B)-(D). 
 
34
 See, e.g., Katz v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 329, 337 (2000) (noting that hearings before the 
IRS’s Appeals division historically have been informal and, therefore, by analogy CDP 
administrative hearings should also be informal); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1 (2006). 
 
35
 Id. § 6330(c)(2)(A). 
 
36
 Id. § 6330(c)(2)(B).  The statute does not explain what is meant by “or did not otherwise 
have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability.”  Id.  The I.R.C. has interpreted this as 
meaning that the taxpayer did not have an opportunity to dispute the liability at a prior 
conference with Appeals, either before the assessment (for example, during an audit) or after.  
See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3)(vi)Q-E2-A-E2.   
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The Appeals Officer is obligated to make a determination that all procedural 
requirements have been met and all appropriate issues have been considered.  
Further, the Appeals Officer must determine whether the proposed collection action 
balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes against the taxpayer’s concern 
that the collection be no more intrusive than necessary.37  When the Appeals Officer 
makes his determination, he will send the taxpayer a Notice of Determination 
letter.38 
B.  Judicial Review of IRS Collection Due Process Hearings 
Internal Revenue Code section 6330(d)(1) merely provides that the taxpayer is 
entitled to judicial review in the Tax Court.  Congress failed to specify in the statute 
the standard for review that the courts should apply when reviewing collection due 
process appeals; however, the legislative history states that Congress intended for the 
courts to consider appeals of the underlying tax liability on a de novo basis and to 
consider appeals from the proposed collection on an abuse of discretion basis.39  The 
Tax Court has adopted this standard.40 
Because the collection due process (CDP) administrative hearings before the IRS 
are informal, there is very little record available for the Tax Court to review.  The 
administrative record in CDP appeals usually contains the following: the CDP lien or 
levy notice; the taxpayer’s request for a CDP hearing and any other correspondence; 
the Appeals Officer’s history notes and Notice of Determination; the appeals 
transmittal and case memoranda; a summary of the taxpayer’s account; any 
documents submitted by the taxpayer after the date of the hearing request up until 
the date of the Notice of Determination; and any tape recordings or transcriptions of 
the hearing if made.41  Because the hearings are informal and not recorded, there is 
usually no transcript of the proceedings available for court review on appeal.  
                                                          
 
37
 I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3). 
 
38
 Treas. Reg. § 301.6630-1(e)(3)(vi)Q-E8-A-E8.  “Taxpayers will be sent a dated Notice 
of Determination by certified or registered mail.”  Id. 
 
39
 H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 265 (1998). 
Where the validity of the tax liability was properly at issue in the hearing, and where 
the determination with regard to the tax liability is a part of the appeal, no levy may 
take place during the pendency of the appeal.  The amount of the tax liability will in 
such cases be reviewed by the appropriate court on a de novo basis.  Where the 
validity of the tax liability is not properly part of the appeal, the taxpayer may 
challenge the determination of the appeals officer for abuse of discretion.  In such 
cases, the appeals officer’s determination . . . will be reviewed using an abuse of 
discretion standard of review. 
Id.    
 
40
 Davis v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 35, 39 (2000).  When the district courts had joint 
jurisdiction with the Tax Court over collection due process appeals, the district courts also 
adopted these standards.  As shall be discussed below, there was a dichotomy in how the Tax 
Court and the district courts actually applied the abuse of discretion standard with the district 
courts applying abuse of discretion as it is traditionally interpreted under administrative law 
jurisprudence and the Tax Court applying what really amounted to de novo review.  Id.  
 
41
 See, e.g., Lane, supra note 6, at 155.  
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Because the Tax Court does not consider itself bound by either traditional 
administrative law jurisprudence or the APA, the Tax Court does not limit its 
judicial review to the record created at the administrative hearing (the record rule).42  
Instead, the Tax Court has permitted taxpayers to expand the record with testimony 
on matters not considered by the Appeals Officer.  In Robinette v. Commissioner,43 
the Tax Court reiterated its position, which position the Tax Court has adhered to in 
subsequent cases.44  After failing to pay almost one million dollars in taxes, Dr. 
Robinette entered into an offer-in-compromise in 1995 with the IRS in which he 
agreed to pay $100,000 in settlement of his tax liabilities and to file his income tax 
returns for the next five years on a timely basis.45  If Dr. Robinette failed to file his 
returns on a timely basis, the offer-in-compromise could be revoked and he would 
again be liable for the full amount of his tax liability.46   
Subsequently, he received an extension until October 15, 1999 to file his 1998 
tax return.47  Dr. Robinette’s accountant, Mr. Coy, later testified before the Tax 
Court that on October 15 he drove to Dr. Robinette’s home sometime between 8:45 
p.m. and 9:00 p.m., returned to his office, sometime after 11:00 p.m. but before 
12:00 a.m., where he affixed the appropriate amount of postage to the envelope 
containing Dr. Robinette’s tax return, using a private postage meter in his office, and 
then deposited the envelope in the U.S. Postal Service mailbox in his building. 48 
On no less than three occasions, the IRS notified Dr. Robinette that it had not 
received his 1998 tax return and warned him that the offer-in-compromise was in 
jeopardy if he did not provide a copy.49  Although Dr. Robinette did not respond to 
the IRS, he testified at the Tax Court that he gave these letters to Mr. Coy.50  The 
IRS finally sent Dr. Robinette a letter informing him that the offer-in-compromise 
was in default and then sent him a final notice of intent to levy.  Mr. Coy timely 
requested an administrative collection due process hearing before the IRS on the 
grounds that Dr. Robinette did not owe the money.51  
At the collection due process hearing, the only evidence the Appeals Officer 
would consider for proof of mailing was a certified mail or registered mail receipt 
and refused to consider Dr. Robinette’s pattern of asking for extensions and filing on 
                                                          
 
42
 Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 94-95 (2004).  The Tax Court acknowledges that 
although the proper standard for review is abuse of discretion, the scope of review is, 
essentially, de novo in that the Tax Court can hear new evidence.  Id.  
 
43
 Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85 (2004). 
 
44
 Oropeza. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-094, discussed infra notes 67, 68 and 
accompanying text. 
 
45
 Dr. Robinette had income tax liabilities for the years 1983 through 1991 and 
employment tax liabilities for portions of 1988, 1989, and 1990 for a total liability of 
$989,475.  Robinette, 123 T.C. at 86. 
 
46
 Id. at 86-87. 
 
47
 Id. at 87. 
 
48
 Id. at 88. 
 
49
 Id. at 89-90. 
 
50
 Id. 
 
51
 Id. at 90. 
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October 15, as he had done in previous years.52  The Appeals Officer issued a Notice 
of Determination to Dr. Robinette declaring that the offer-in-compromise was in 
default and that collection proceedings would continue.53  Dr. Robinette filed a 
timely appeal with the Tax Court contending, inter alia, that the Appeals Officer 
should have considered Mr. Coy’s testimony and records.  The Tax Court agreed, 
but rather than remand the matter back to the IRS, the Tax Court allowed Dr. 
Robinette to introduce this evidence into the record stating that “we are not limited 
by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and our review is not limited to the 
administrative record.”54  The Tax Court noted that it had so held in a number of 
previous cases regarding requests by taxpayers to supplement the administrative 
record created at the IRS hearing. 
Since the enactment of section 6330, the Court has applied our 
traditional de novo procedures in deciding whether an Appeals officer 
abused his or her discretion in determining to proceed with collection.  At 
trials under section 6330 when reviewing for abuse of discretion, the 
Court has received into evidence testimony and exhibits that were not 
included in the administrative record.  See, e.g., Wells v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2003-234 (taxpayer’s testimony admissible at trial when he 
was represented by counsel and taxpayer was not present at hearing); 
Maloney v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-143 (taxpayers presented 
numerous letters sent to Commissioner asking him to recalculate their 
FICA taxes as evidence of claimed overpayments) . . . Gougler v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-185 (Court considered two documents 
at trial that were not presented to Appeals officer); Holliday v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-67 (Commissioner permitted to present 
documents, records, and testimony at trial that was not part of 
administrative record) . . . .55 
The only federal district or appellate court case that the Tax Court cited in support of 
its position was from the taxpayer’s appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Holliday.56  
The Tax Court went on to observe that “[t]he APA has never governed 
proceedings in the Court (or in the Board of Tax Appeals)”57 and cited in support a 
                                                          
 
52
 Id. at 91. 
 
53
 Id.  
 
54
 Id. at 95. 
 
55
 Id. at 95-96. 
 
56
 Holliday v. Comm’r, 57 F.App’x 774 (9th Cir. 2003).  The Ninth Circuit in an 
unpublished opinion simply stated that “the ‘record review’ provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act . . . do not apply to the Tax Court.”  In support of its position, the Ninth Circuit 
relied on 5 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1), holding that the “APA does not apply where ‘a matter [is] 
subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de novo in a court.’”  Id.  However, 5 
U.S.C § 544(a)(1) dictates when an agency must conduct its hearings in accordance with 
formal, trial-type procedures and which section goes on to provide that an agency is exempt 
from using formal adjudication if the matter will be tried de novo in a court of law.   
 
57
 Robinette, 123 T.C. at 96. 
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number of cases, including O’Dwyer v. Commissioner58 and Nappi v. 
Commissioner.59  However, as shall be discussed more fully below, neither O’Dwyer 
nor Nappi supports the Tax Court’s position.  
Dr. Robinette appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which 
reversed the Tax Court.60  Among other things, the Eighth Circuit held that the Tax 
Court (1) should have adhered to the record rule when conducting its review of the 
IRS’s actions,61 (2) is bound by the APA in this context,62 and (3) had misconstrued 
O’Dwyer and Nappi.63 
The Eighth Circuit’s position regarding the applicability of the record rule and 
the APA to collection due process appeals dovetails with that of the First and Sixth 
Circuit Courts of Appeals when the district courts shared jurisdiction over collection 
due process appeals with the Tax Court.  In Olsen v. United States,64 the taxpayer 
argued that the district court was in error when it upheld the IRS’s determination that 
the levy should proceed.  The taxpayer argued that the district court should have 
permitted him to conduct discovery while the collection due process appeal was 
before the district court rather than limiting him to the administrative record created 
at the IRS collection due process hearing.  The First Circuit ruled against the 
taxpayer, stating that the district court’s review was limited to the administrative 
record, and if that record was inadequate, the appropriate course of action is to 
remand the matter back to the agency for further proceedings rather than attempting 
to supplement the administrative record with new evidence: 
We turn next to Olsen’s argument that the district court erred in denying 
his motion to conduct discovery and in limiting its review to the 
administrative record.  The Supreme Court has consistently stated that 
review of administrative decisions is “ordinarily limited to consideration 
of the decision of the agency . . . and of the evidence on which it was 
based,” and that “no de novo proceeding may be held.”  United States v. 
Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 714-15, 83 S.Ct. 1409, 10 L.Ed.2d 
652 (1963).  “[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the 
administrative record already in existence, not some new record made 
initially in the reviewing court.”  Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 
S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973).  See also Florida Power & Light Co. 
v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985) 
(“The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA 
standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706, to the agency decision based on the 
record the agency presents to the reviewing court.”). 
It is true the instant record is not of a formal adjudication.  But an 
administrative record was compiled and made available, reflecting the 
                                                          
 
58
 O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1959). 
 
59
 Nappi v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 282 (1972).   
 
60
 Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 
61
 Id. at 459-61. 
 
62
 Id. at 460 n.4. 
 
63
 Id. at 461. 
 
64
 Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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actions, contentions, and reasoning of those involved.  And the Supreme 
Court has made clear that the record rule extends to informal agency 
adjudications.  See, e.g., Lorion, 470 U.S. at 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598 (“The 
APA specifically contemplates judicial review on the basis of the agency 
record compiled in the course of informal agency action in which a 
hearing has not occurred.”) . . . .  In the event the administrative record is 
found inadequate for judicial review, “the proper course, except in rare 
circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or 
explanation.”  Id.; see also Carlo Bianchi, 373 U.S. at 718, 83 S.Ct. 1409 
(remand “would certainly be justified where the department had failed to 
make adequate provision for a record that could be subjected to judicial 
scrutiny”) . . . .65   
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Living Care Alternatives v. United 
States,66 also held that the reviewing court should limit its review of the IRS’s action 
to the record created during the administrative hearing. 
Subsequently, the Tax Court decided Oropeza v. Commissioner,67 and the Tax 
Court again determined that it was not bound by either the APA or traditional 
administrative law jurisprudence when conducting judicial review of IRS 
administrative-level collection due process hearings.68   
The Tax Court places great reliance on its history as an entity, which, 
historically, has reviewed on a de novo basis IRS determinations that a taxpayer 
owes a tax, stating a number of times that the Tax Court and its predecessors have 
never been subject to the APA.  It is true that the Tax Court and its predecessors 
have never been charged with the typical agency responsibilities of rulemaking or 
investigation of taxpayer behavior, but rather only had adjudicatory duties.  That 
fact, however, is not dispositive of the question.  Other agencies also operate in this 
fashion.69  The position that the Tax Court and its predecessors have “always” been 
                                                          
 
65
 Id. at 155. 
 
66
 Living Care Alternatives of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2005).  
The Sixth Circuit discussed Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States, No. Civ.A. 00-B-851, 2000 WL 
1745280, at *7 (D. Colo. 2000), where the district court held that the administrative record 
was inadequate and remanded the matter back to the IRS for further proceedings.  The Sixth 
Circuit believed that the Mesa Oil district court had applied an overly rigorous standard of 
review but also believed that the district court acted properly in remanding the matter to the 
agency rather than attempting to supplement the record during the court proceedings.  Living 
Care Alternatives, 411 F.3d at 629.  
 
67
 Oropeza v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-094. 
 
68
 Id. at 4. 
 
69
 Tax enforcement is not the only area in which the Congress has deemed it wise to 
separate out the enforcement and prosecutorial duties from the adjudicatory duties.  In 1970, 
Congress created two entities to implement occupational safety and health: (1) the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (which is located within the Department of 
Labor), which makes policy, conducts investigations, and assesses penalties, and (2) the 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (an independent commission), which 
adjudicates contested assessments.  Despite the fact that the Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission is a stand alone entity and only charged with adjudicatory duties, no one 
contends that it is, therefore, not an agency.  Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 
U.S.C. § 651 (2006). 
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considered exempt from traditional administrative law, and the APA specifically, is 
somewhat simplistic and ignores the Tax Court’s own history, which reveals that 
courts and executive officials questioned this contention a number of times.  
III.  EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT 
A.  Committee on Appeals and Review: Administrative Agency 
Prior to enactment of the modern federal income tax, the federal government 
derived most of its revenues from tariffs and customs duties on imports, from some 
internal excise taxes (for example on the sale of alcohol and tobacco), and from the 
sale of public lands.70  In 1913, Congress enacted the Internal Revenue Act of 1913 
(1913 Act)71the predecessor to today’s federal income tax as now codified in Title 
26 of the United States Code.  The 1913 Act was relatively modest in its scope with 
low rates and a generous exemption so that out of a population of 97 million, only 
358,000 individual income tax returns were filed for the 1913 tax year.72  However, 
in 1914, World War I (WWI) began in Europe, and, although the United States 
would not officially enter the conflict until the spring of 1917, the United States 
immediately experienced financial repercussions from the war as a result of (1) 
reduced revenues from customs receipts due to trade reduction with Europe, and (2) 
increased government expenditures as the United States made preparations to enter 
the conflict.73  In response, Congress enacted the Revenue Acts of 1916,74 1917,75 
and 191876 (collectively, WWI Revenue Acts), which raised tax rates and reduced 
the exemption amount and also enacted the excess profits tax77 in an attempt to stem 
war profiteering.78  Each one of these revenue measures added more complexity to 
the ever-evolving new tax code and also increased the number of taxpayers who 
were required to file returns so that by 1917, 3.5 million individuals filed income tax 
returns, and by 1920, the number had increased to seven million.79  
The federal government needed an agency to administer this new tax system.  In 
1861 and 1862, Congress had enacted legislation temporarily creating an income tax 
                                                          
 
70
 HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 2 
(1979).  Prior to 1913, Congress enacted a federal income tax for two brief periods during our 
country’s history: during the Civil War and at the turn of the nineteenth century, although 
Congress had considered enacting an income tax at other times such as during the War of 
1812.  Id. 
 
71
 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.  Several years earlier, in 1909, Congress had 
enacted a federal income tax on corporations.  Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112. 
 
72
 DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 8. 
 
73
 Id. at 8-9. 
 
74
 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756. 
 
75
 Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300. 
 
76
 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057. 
 
77
 Act of Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 159, § 201, 39 Stat. 1000. 
 
78
 DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 9-10. 
 
79
 Id. at 10-12. 
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to finance the Civil War80 and also creating the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Bureau) 
to administer the income tax.81  Although the income tax was repealed after the Civil 
War, the Bureau remained in existence to administer what few internal revenue taxes 
remained—such as on alcohol and tobacco—and to perform certain other 
miscellaneous duties such as administering the bounty for United States sugar 
producers, certifying Chinese laborers, and collecting the tax on opium and 
oleomargarine.82   
The Bureau struggled to keep up with its new duties imposed by the Act of 1913, 
but when Congress enacted the WWI Revenue Acts, the Bureau was overwhelmed.  
The Bureau felt compelled to audit every return that was filed while, at the same 
time, the number of returns and the complexity of the tax code both had dramatically 
increased within the space of a few years.83  Further exacerbating the problem, the 
Bureau was hindered by the lack of trained personnel to audit the returns or answer 
taxpayer questions.  The Bureau made strenuous efforts to recruit auditors at a time 
when the labor market was already reduced due to military recruitment; however, 
each auditor required a training period of several months, and many auditors would 
leave the Bureau within a short period of time to work in the more lucrative private 
sector providing advice to taxpayers.84   
In these first few years, as the Bureau experienced high turnover in its personnel 
and endeavored to interpret the new, ever-changing tax code, it was not uncommon 
for a taxpayer to be subject to multiple audits and assessed differing amounts for the 
same tax year.  Unfortunately, the various revenue acts failed to provide that 
taxpayers should be given any advance notice of the new or changed assessments or 
a hearing to question the alleged liability prior to payment.  If the taxpayer failed to 
pay, the Bureau could begin collection proceedings.85  Prior to the enactment of the 
                                                          
 
80
 Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309; Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 89, 
12 Stat. 432.  See Joe Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative 
History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 713 (2001). 
 
81
 Rev. Act, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 299 (1861). 
 
82
 DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 14. 
 
83
 Id. at 14-15. 
 
84
 Id. at 15-16. 
The scope of the problem is revealed by the fact that in 1920, 50% of the personnel of 
the Income Tax Unit, which had primary responsibility for income and excess profits 
tax matters, either resigned or were discharged.  Roughly, then, the average tenure at 
that time was approximately one year and, when the training period is taken into 
account, the time actually spent on Bureau work by the average employee was six to 
eight months.   
Id. at 16. 
 
85
 Id. at 20-21.  A taxpayer who disputed an assessed liability had two choices: (1) pay the 
tax and then file for a refund with the Commissioner of the Bureau, and if the Commissioner 
rejected the refund request, file suit in either the federal district court or the court of claims, or 
(2) not pay the tax and file with the Bureau a claim of abatement, which required the taxpayer 
to post a bond for the disputed tax and which procedure was subject to a number of 
exceptions.  Id. at 21-23, 28-35. 
 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss3/5
2010] IS THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT EXEMPT 617 
 
permanent federal income tax in 1913, when the federal government had relied 
primarily on license fees, customs duties, and excise taxes for revenue, the “pay first, 
argue later” system was not considered to be overly onerous on taxpayers.  However, 
the WWI Revenue Acts imposed very high rates on high income taxpayers so that 
the “pay first” rule became harsh and further fueled the need for an impartial tribunal 
to provide taxpayers with some opportunity to dispute a tax before assessment and 
collection.86 
The federal government needed to find a way to alleviate taxpayer dissatisfaction 
with the new tax so that taxpayers would continue to comply voluntarily with the 
system and pay.  Over the next few decades, the federal government endeavored to 
find a mechanism or system to enable taxpayers to dispute a tax, but, at the same 
time, not enable taxpayers to hold the government hostage by refusing or delaying 
the payment of the tax.  As discussed below, the government initially created an 
entity within the Bureau itself to hear disputes, then shifted to an agency independent 
of the Treasury Department or the Bureau, and then, finally, created an Article I 
court, which sat in a courthouse separate from the Treasury Department.  The dispute 
mechanism or system evolved in this way in order to provide taxpayers with 
assurance that the dispute mechanism was not a sham or biased in favor of the 
government.  Congress steadily increased the autonomy of the dispute mechanism to 
bolster public trust in the tax system.  
The Commissioner created a subdivision within the Bureau in late 1919 or early 
1920: the Committee on Appeals and Review (Committee);87 it was separate from 
the Income Tax Unit (which was responsible for administering the income and 
excess profit taxes), although the Committee was staffed by five former members of 
the Unit.88  Initially, the Committee’s purpose was twofold: (1) to hear taxpayer 
appeals, and (2) to advise the Commissioner regarding the preparation of Treasury 
decisions, regulations, and rulings, with most of the Committee’s time being spent 
on the latter.89  
However, in 1921, Congress amended the tax code by enacting the Revenue Act 
of 1921, which required the Commissioner to give a taxpayer notice of an 
                                                          
  Filing suit for a refund was not a straightforward matter at the time.  Prior to 1921, 
refund suits could be brought against the United States under the Tucker Act, which had been 
enacted in 1886.  If the claim exceeded $10,000, however, the taxpayer had to proceed against 
the collector personally.  Unfortunately for the taxpayer, if the collector were dead or no 
longer in office, the taxpayer could not sue in district court but had to go to the, then, Court of 
Claims.  The Tucker Act eventually was amended so that taxpayers could sue in the district 
court for refunds in excess of $10,000 even if the collector had died or was out of office.  See 
Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 152 (1960); Camp, supra note 12, at 21 n.86. 
 
86
 CHARLES D. HAMEL & EDWARD H. MCDERMOTT, HAMEL’S MANUAL OF BOARD OF TAX 
APPEALS PRACTICE 4-5 (Prentice-Hall 1929). 
 
87
 1920 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 14-15. 
 
88
 DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 39.  The Committee’s size increased to ten in 1922 and then 
to twenty in 1923.  Id. at 41 nn.232-33.  See 1920 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 15; 1921 
COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 14; 1922 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 15; 1923 COMM’R. OF INT. REV. 
REP. 9. 
 
89
 DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 39, 41. 
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assessment and an opportunity to file an administrative appeal,90 and the Committee 
was given the task of hearing these section 250(d) appeals, which occupied most of 
the Committee’s time.  As noted by the Commissioner at the time, “[t]he duties of 
the Committee became ‘more closely confined to . . . [those] of a purely appellate 
body.’”91  Although individual Committee members would hear an appeal, the 
Committee would meet to approve each recommendation of each member.  After the 
Committee increased in size and was divided into subcommittees, each 
subcommittee would meet to approve each member’s recommendation, and then the 
subcommittee’s recommendation would be forwarded to the Chairman of the 
Committee for his review and approval.  This process was designed to ensure 
consistency in decision-making among the Committee members.92  Beginning in 
1923, the Committee began to dispatch subcommittees to cities other than 
Washington, D.C., to hear cases.93   
This collegiality with regard to the decision process, review by the chairman of 
the Committee, and circuit riding were practices that carried over to the Board of 
Tax Appeals and then later to the Article I United States Tax Court.  However, the 
Committee differed in some important ways from its successors.  The Committee 
was not a fact finder during appeal hearings and did not operate as a trial court, but 
rather functioned in an appellate capacity.94  Taxpayers submitted evidence in 
written form95 and could request an oral hearing and submit written briefs.96  The 
hearings were informal and non-adversarial, and “Committee proceedings frequently 
became negotiating sessions; in these cases Committee recommendations were no 
more than settlements of disputed issues rather than judicial determinations of legal 
questions.”97  
However, almost from the Committee’s inception, it was faced with calls for its 
replacement by an independent Board of Tax Appeals, which would operate with 
more formal procedures.98  The Committee’s status as an entity within the Bureau 
                                                          
 
90
 Rev. Act, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 265 (1921). 
 
91
 1923 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 8, in DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 41 n.236. 
 
92
 DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 40. 
 
93
 Id. at 42. 
 
94
 1923 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 8 (“In its later years, the Commissioner referred to the 
Committee as a ‘quasi-judicial body of appellate jurisdiction.’”).  See DUBROFF, supra note 
70, at 42.   
 
95
 The Committee could, in its discretion, accept new evidence.  See A.R.M. 219, III-1 C. 
B. 319, 319-20 (1924). 
 
96
 Id.; O.D. 709, 3 C. B. 370 (1920).  
 
97
 DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 43. 
 
98
 The American Mining Congress and the United States Chamber of Commerce proposed 
creation of a Board of Tax Appeals.  The most influential advocate for an independent Board 
of Tax Appeals was the Tax Simplification Board, created by the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 
136, § 1327, 42 Stat. 317, whose purpose was to investigate the administration of the internal 
revenue laws.  DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 51.  In addition, on November 10, 1923, the 
Secretary of the Treasury issued his annual report in which he recommended the creation of a 
board of tax appeals to be located within the Treasury Department, although either party 
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undermined the public’s confidence in its independence in two, somewhat 
contradictory ways.  First, the public was concerned that the Committee was inclined 
to find in the Bureau’s favor because if the Bureau prevailed in the appeal, the 
taxpayer would be forced to pay the tax and then sue for a refund; however, if the 
taxpayer prevailed in the appeal, that was the end of the matter because the 
Committee was part of the Bureau and, therefore, the Committee’s decision 
represented the final decision of the Bureau (at least after 1923).  This created the 
impression, if not the reality, that the Committee was biased, in favor of the Bureau, 
to generate revenue.99  Second, the newspapers had publicized several cases in which 
the Committee ruled in favor of taxpayers who received very large refunds.  Because 
of the informal, nonpublic nature of Committee hearings, the public feared that some 
taxpayers were receiving special treatment.100   
B.  The Board of Tax Appeals: Independent Administrative Agency 
Taxpayers still had the right to pay a tax and sue for a refund in either the, then, 
Claims Court or the district courts, both of which were completely independent of 
the executive branch and, therefore, taxpayers could be confident of their 
impartiality.  However, Congress did not want to create a new Article III court to 
hear pre-payment disputes, yet still needed to reassure taxpayers that the system was 
fair.  One way to do so was to remove the decision-making function from the same 
agency that investigated and prosecuted delinquent taxpayers.  As a result, Congress 
passed the Revenue Act of 1924,101 which created the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), 
an agency located within the executive branch and independent of both the Bureau 
and the Department of the Treasury.102  The Revenue Act of 1924 empowered the 
BTA to conduct pre-assessment review of income, estate and gift, and excess profits 
taxes.103  Unlike the prior Committee that it was replacing, the BTA was to operate 
                                                          
dissatisfied with the result could then sue in federal court.  See HAMEL & MCDERMOTT, supra 
note 86, at 5.  
 
99
 DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 41-42. 
 
100
 Sully, Those Refunded Millions, SATURDAY EVENING POST, June 21, 1924, at 36, cited 
in DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 45 n.260. 
 
101
 Rev. Act, ch. 234, § 1100(a), 43 Stat. 352 (1924). 
 
102
 Rev. Act, ch. 234, § 900(a), (k), 43 Stat. 336, 338 (1924).  For an overview of the 
various House and Senate proposals and committee reports detailing how Congress progressed 
from creating the BTA as an agency under the control of the Treasury Department to that of 
an independent, stand-alone agency free to create its own rules and procedures, see Appeal of 
S. Cal. Loan Ass’n, 4 B.T.A. 223, 229-34 (1926); Old Colony Trust v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 
721-22 (1929).   
 
103
 Rev. Act, ch. 234, § 324, 43 Stat. 316 (1924).  The BTA also was authorized to hear 
taxpayer appeals from jeopardy assessments if the taxpayer filed a claim in abatement.  Id. §§ 
279, 312, 43 Stat. 300, 310 (1924).  As noted, in 1924 a number of excise taxes existed, such 
as on cameras, corporate stock, mah-jongg sets, and narcotics, but because these excise taxes 
did not raise a significant amount of revenue, the BTA was not given authority to provide pre-
assessment review for them.  DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 73; see infra note 138.  See also 
Flora, 362 U.S. at 158. 
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in a more structured manner and was to publish its decisions; however, the BTA 
created its own procedures and rules of evidence.104   
Because the BTA was an independent agency, it no longer could privately review 
the Bureau’s or Treasury Department’s files, but rather would need to render a 
decision based on the information the taxpayer and the Bureau presented to the 
BTA.105  However, the BTA’s findings, conclusions, and decisions were merely 
prima facie evidence in the event of a future trial.   Neither party had the right to 
challenge directly the BTA’s decisions by filing an appeal in the circuit courts.  
Rather, the BTA’s decisions were merely considered to be prima facie evidence if 
either party filed a subsequent action in the district courts, which action would be 
heard de novo.106  Therefore, if the taxpayer prevailed before the BTA, the Bureau 
could not summarily assess the tax, but had to commence a new action in federal 
court for a readjudication of whether a deficiency existed.  If the Bureau prevailed 
before the BTA, the Bureau could immediately assess and collect the tax; however, 
the taxpayer could sue in court for a refund.107  As a result, as noted by the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the hearings before the BTA were “little more than a 
preliminary skirmish, a run for luck.”108  
                                                          
 
104
 Rev. Act, ch. 234, § 900(g), (h), 43 Stat. 337, 338 (1924). 
Hearings before the Board and its divisions shall be open to the public.  The 
proceedings of the Board and its divisions shall be conducted in accordance with such 
rules of evidence and procedure as the Board may prescribe.  It shall be the duty of the 
Board and of each division to make a report in writing of its findings of fact and 
decision in each case, and a copy of its report shall be entered of record and a copy 
furnished the taxpayer.  If the amount of tax in controversy is more than $10,000 the 
oral testimony taken at the hearing shall be reduced to writing and the report shall 
contain an opinion in writing in addition to the findings of fact and decision.  All 
reports of the Board and its divisions and all evidence received by the Board and its 
divisions . . . shall be public records open to the inspection of the public.  The Board 
shall provide for the publication of its reports at the Government Printing Office . . . . 
Id. at 337-38. 
 
105
 Appeal of Lyon, 1 B.T.A. 378, 379 (1925) (“[E]vidence that has been introduced before 
any other department of the Government must be reintroduced before this Board before we 
can consider it.”).  
 
106
 Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 721-22.  See also Appeal of Union Metal Mfg. Co., 4 
B.T.A. 287, 289 (1926). 
The remedy of trial before the Board before payment was supplemental to the 
taxpayer’s established remedy by suit in court after payment.  This added remedy the 
taxpayer could avail himself of at his pleasure and to the extent he might desire and 
still retain his preexisting remedy in court.  When he sued in court the Board’s 
decision had not the force of a judgment, binding unless reversed, but by section 
900(g), ‘the findings of the Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein 
stated.’  It was clearly contemplated that, so far as all the courts were concerned, the 
Board’s decision and findings of fact should not be res adjudicata but should merely 
be prima facie evidence. 
Id. 
 
107
 See DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 116. 
 
108
 Blair v. Curran, 24 F.2d 390, 392 (1st Cir. 1928). 
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This system proved to be inefficient because each case heard by the BTA could 
be retried by the district court, and then subject to appeal in the courts of appeals, 
and then appeal to the United States Supreme Court (assuming the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari).  Therefore, in the Revenue Act of 1926, Congress 
provided for direct judicial review of the BTA’s decisions by either party filing “a 
petition for review in a Circuit Court of Appeals or the Court of Appeals of the 
District of Columbia under rules adopted by such courts.”109  If either party appealed, 
the matter would be heard as an appellate matter in the court of appeals (including 
possibly in the court of appeals for the District of Columbia) and would no longer be 
retried de novo in the district courts.110  As a result, the BTA needed to operate in a 
more formal fashion in order to create an appropriate record for appellate review.111  
The Revenue Act of 1926 provided that the BTA’s rules of evidence had to be in 
accordance with the rules of equity applicable in the District of Columbia.112 
                                                          
 
109
 Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 722.  Either the taxpayer or the Commissioner had to file 
the petition within six months or the BTA’s decision would be final.  Only by filing an appeal 
within six months could the taxpayer delay the assessment or the collection of the tax.  Id. at 
725-26.  See also Rev. Act, ch. 27, §§ 1001, 1005, 44 Stat. 109, 110 (1926).   
In 1948, Congress enacted legislation to clarify that decisions of the then denominated “Tax 
Court of the United States” (still an independent agency in the executive branch but with a 
judicial title) be reviewed on appeal under the same standards applicable to decisions of the 
district courts sitting without juries.  Rev. Act, ch. 646, § 36, 62 Stat. 991 (1948).   
 
110
 Rev. Act, ch. 27, § 1003(b), 44 Stat. 110 (1926) (providing that the courts of appeals 
and the United States Supreme Court “shall have power to affirm or, if the decision of the 
Board is not in accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the decision of the Board, with or 
without remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice may require”).  See also Old Colony 
Trust, 279 U.S. at 722. 
 
111
 See Curran, 24 F.2d at 392. 
[The BTA] was created by the Act of 1924 to decide tax appeals. . . .  It was 
authorized to establish its own rules of evidence and procedure. . . .  Consequently it 
was not restricted by legal rules of evidence, but could receive such evidence as 
seemed to it worthy of credit, though not measuring up to the legal standard.  No 
appeal from or right of review of the Board’s decision was provided.  The parties, 
therefore, did not contemplate an appeal, and there was no occasion for their saving 
their rights by way of exceptions to evidence and requests for findings and rulings, to 
be preserved in a record on appeal.   
Id. 
 
112
 Rev. Act § 907(a) (1926), cited in Curran, 24 F.2d at 392. 
The Revenue Act of 1926 radically changed the situation from what it had previously 
been.  By it the Circuit Courts of Appeals were given exclusive jurisdiction to review 
the decision of the Board. . . .  In furtherance of this the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
were authorized to adopt rules for the preparation of the record for review . . . the 
hearings before the Board were to be stenographically reported; and defined rules of 
evidence were prescribed. . . .  It took away the right of a party aggrieved by a 
decision of the Board to bring a court action and have a trial de novo on issues of fact 
and law . . . and limited his right to a review of the Board’s decision in the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals on questions of law only. 
Id. 
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As the Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative 
Procedure113 later noted, oftentimes it is unduly burdensome for agencies to comply 
with the rules of evidence for jury trials; however, agencies generally do observe 
some standard with regard to the proffering and acceptance of evidence, and the 
Acheson Report found nothing out of the ordinary with regard to the BTA’s standard 
of the rules of equity applicable to the District of Columbia.  Certainly, this evidence 
standard does not signify that the BTA was a court and not an agency. 
The absence of a jury and the technical subject-matter with which 
agencies often deal, all weigh heavily against a requirement that 
administrative agencies observe what is know as  the “common law rules” 
of evidence for jury trials.  Such a requirement would be inconsistent with 
the objectives of dispatch, elasticity, and simplicity which the 
administrative process is designed to promote. 
. . . . 
As a result, it is rarely suggested that the older common law rules of 
evidence for jury trials should be imposed upon administrative agencies.  
Congressional sanction has been given to varying degrees of relaxation.  
The Federal Power Commission and the National Labor Relations Board 
are expressly freed from application of “the rules of evidence.”  The 
Board of Tax Appeals must observe only the rules of evidence applicable 
in the courts of the District of Columbia in equity proceedings.  Even 
where the statute is silent, some agencies have prescribed adherence to 
reasonable requirements.114 
The federal courts, and the BTA itself, repeatedly acknowledged that it was an 
agency, albeit an “anomalous” one with strictly judicial duties.115  For example, in 
                                                          
 
113
 See discussion infra Part III, C. 
 
114
 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8 at 70 (1941). 
 
115
 Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 725 (“The Board of Tax Appeals is not a court.”); see 
also Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926) noting that the BTA 
was an independent agency in the executive branch of the government, albeit one with “quasi-
judicial duties”.  The Supreme Court went on to note that it would be odd for the BTA not to 
be authorized to prescribe rules of practice for the admission of attorneys permitted to practice 
before it “when in the Treasury Department and the office of the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue there is a list of attorneys enrolled for practice in the very cases which are to be 
appealed to the Board.”  Id.  The Supreme Court compared the Board’s authority in this area 
to two agencies and not to the federal courts; Shults Bread Co. v. Comm’r , 10 B.T.A. 268, 
270-71 (1928).  The Board held that it was not bound by the interpretations the federal courts 
have placed on rules of practice and procedure and the permitted relaxation thereof. 
Both of the parties have failed to point out whether the same lines of reasoning 
applied to the construction of rules of court are applicable in construing the rules of 
this Board.  If the same reasoning applies it must be on the postulate that the Board is 
a court.  The Board in many respects occupies a unique position in the governmental 
scheme.  It is clearly denominated by Congress as ‘an independent agency in the 
executive branch of the Government.’  Its functions, however, are at least quasi-
judicial . . . and it has ‘appellate powers which are judicial in character’ . . . .  Its 
proceedings are required by statute to be conducted ‘in accordance with the rules of 
evidence applicable in courts of equity in the District of Columbia.’  From it, despite 
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1927, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in Chicago Railway 
Equipment Co. v. Blair116 in which the Court held that the BTA had failed to carry 
out its duties as an agency, and conduct its own investigation, when neither the 
Commissioner nor the taxpayer had introduced evidence on a critical issue.  In 
Chicago Railway Equipment Co., the taxpayer and the Commissioner disagreed as to 
the fair market value of certain depreciable property as of March 1, 1913 (when the 
federal income tax was first imposed).117  The federal tax code at that time provided 
that depreciation was to be calculated based on the property’s fair market value as of 
that date, and if the fair market value could not be determined, then by the property’s 
cost less any depreciation that had been taken as of that date.118  The Commissioner 
calculated the depreciation based on cost and stated that there was no evidence 
available as to the property’s fair market value. 
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to the BTA because 
“the board disregarded competent and material evidence bearing upon the market 
value as of that date.”119  The Court reviewed the chronology of the taxpayer’s 
business, including its acquisition of the various pieces of depreciable property, 
which would indicate the fair market value and noted that it was “not possible that in 
their investigation [the revenue agents] remained ignorant of so many of the facts 
above herein recited.”120  The Court then went on to hold that the BTA had erred in 
failing to consider this evidence. 
Congress disagreed with the Seventh Circuit that the BTA had a duty to conduct 
its own independent investigation.  The House version of the Revenue Bill of 1928 
contained a provision stating that “no decision of the board . . . should hereafter be 
modified or reversed because the board . . . has failed to consider evidence not 
adduced [at the hearing].”121  The Senate agreed with the House in principle but 
thought it unnecessary to include the provision in the final bill because the 
legislative history made it clear to the courts Congress’s view that the BTA was an 
executive agency but that it only performed a judicial-type function.122  
                                                          
its being an executive body, appeals may be taken directly to the Federal courts.  
These considerations serve to show the anomalous character of the Board and in our 
opinion decisions of the judiciary as to their rules can not be taken bodily and set 
down as conclusive upon us. 
Id.  But see S. Cal. Loan, 4 B.T.A. at 234, in which the BTA responded with asperity, if not 
outright indignation, to the petitioner’s contention that “this Board is purely an administrative 
branch of the executive branch of the executive department and does not partake, nor have the 
aspects of, a judicial tribunal,” id. at 229.  After an extensive review of its legislative history, 
the BTA held meritless petitioner’s contention that the rules applicable to court procedure had 
no application to the BTA.  Id. at 234.     
 
116
 Chicago Ry. Equip. Co. v. Blair, 20 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1927). 
 
117
 Id. at 11. 
 
118
 Id. at 13. 
 
119
 Id. 
 
120
 Id. at 14. 
 
121
 H.R. REP. NO. 70-2, at 30-31 (1927); H.R. REP. NO. 70-1882, at 21-22 (1928).   
 
122
 S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 38 (1928).  See also DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 167. 
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C.  Final Report of Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure 
Administrative agencies began to proliferate at the beginning of the twentieth 
century and, in particular, during the Roosevelt administration.123  However, these 
agencies oftentimes operated with great independence, and there was no coherent or 
consistent governing principles as to how the agencies operated or the standards the 
courts should employ when conducting judicial review.124  In late 1938, Attorney 
General Homer Cummings sent a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt urging him 
to request that Congress authorize the Attorney General to form a committee to 
investigate the procedures by which administrative agencies operate and the 
standards the courts should employ when conducting judicial review.125   
                                                          
 
123
 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges 
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1561-62 (1996). 
  The Great Depression accelerated a trend that had begun in the late nineteenth 
century toward greater control of the economy by federal commissions and agencies.  
Even before 1929, the federal government had already reached far into the nation’s 
economic life.  Before 1900, approximately one-third of present federal agencies 
already existed. . . .  In the first three decades of the twentieth century . . . the number 
of agencies doubled. . . . 
  Growth in the number of agencies quickened under Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
administration.  Upon taking office in 1933, Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress 
moved quickly to save the country from the economic and social devastation that the 
Depression had caused.  An avalanche of new federal agencies and commissions . . . 
reached ever more broadly into a free market that appeared to have failed. 
Id.  
 
124
 S. DOC. NO. 79-248 (1946) (comments of Rep. Doliver), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 379-80 (1946).  
  Mr. Chairman, during the period of time since the close of the First World War, 
there has been a tremendous expansion of the number of agencies, administrative 
bodies, and commissions of the United States Government. . . . 
  It necessarily followed, I suppose, since so many of them were created, that each of 
them would develop its own variety of procedure—that each of them would have its 
own method of doing business.  Accordingly the problem that confronted the citizen 
who overstepped the bounds of the rules of some agency was to discover how to 
alleviate the situation.  It was more complex because there were no uniform rules of 
procedure, and a person had to delve into the intricacies of each agency or each 
commission in order to find out what to do.   
  This bill is certainly a step in the right direction.  It attempts to give some 
uniformity of procedure.  It attempts to direct these agencies and commissions and 
departments to use forms that can be understood which shall be uniform through all of 
them. 
  Not only does it promote uniformity but it codifies the procedures in a court review. 
Id. (describing agency operations and judicial review that the APA was designed to harmonize 
and make more uniform).  
 
125
 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 252 (1941) (letter from Homer Cummings).  Concerns about 
the increasing power of administrative agencies had been brewing for some time.  As more 
agencies came into existence and increasingly affected every day life, congressional and 
public alarm grew that this unregulated and unelected part of government could impinge on 
due process rights if left unchecked.  At the same time, Congress and the public recognized 
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I venture to bring to your attention, and to renew the suggestion which I 
have made publicly at different times, that there is a need for procedural 
reform in the wide and growing field of administrative law.  Experience 
has proved the importance and necessity for the increasing use of the 
administrative process in the aid of executive, legislative, and judicial 
function.  Government cannot perform its many and varied tasks without 
this efficient and flexible instrumentality.  Its usefulness and increasing 
assistance to the functions of government necessarily depend, however, 
upon a procedure which affords quick and well informed action, grounded 
upon the fundamentals of fair play.   
. . . . 
The problem is one which calls for a most thorough survey of existing 
practices and procedure and a careful consideration by a trained body, 
constituted of individuals who can detect present deficiencies and point 
the way to improvements in the use of this process . . . . Of course, it goes 
without saying that in such procedure there should be proper safeguards 
for the protection of substantive rights and adequate, but not extravagant, 
judicial review.126 
President Roosevelt responded on February 16, 1939 by directing the Attorney 
General to investigate the issue, noting that “[i]t seems appropriate that the reform of 
administrative procedure should . . . be sponsored by the Department of Justice.”127  
On February 23, 1939, Attorney General Frank Murphy issued Order No. 3215 in 
which he created the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure 
and appointed its members.128  On January 24, 1941, Attorney General Robert H. 
                                                          
that exigencies of modern life necessitated resort to administrative agencies.  Throughout the 
1930s in particular, the government and the American Bar Association called for review of 
administrative agency power. 
The debate may be said to have got beyond the point of mere skirmishing when the 
American Bar Association in the spring of 1933 appointed a Special Committee on 
Administrative Law and to have resulted in a somewhat inconclusive victory for the 
viewers-with-alarm upon passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.  
Significant among the events of the intervening years of contest were this Special 
Committee’s original advocacy of an independent administrative court; the 
abandonment of that effort in 1937 and the decision of the American Bar Association 
to press instead  for legislation to assure the fundamentals of due process; the report in 
that same year of the President’s Committee on Administrative Management, with its 
startling recommendation that the independent agencies be absorbed into the executive 
departments; and, by way of climax, the passage of the Walter-Logan Act followed by 
President Roosevelt’s strongly, if not intemperately, worded veto of that legislation on 
December 18, 1940. 
Id. at vi (Editor’s Preface).  
 
126
 Id. at 252 (letter from Homer Cummings). 
 
127
 Id. (letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt).  
 
128
 Id. (Order No. 3215).  On March 15, 1939, Attorney General Murphy issued 
Supplement No. 1 to Order No. 3215 in which he appointed additional members to the 
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure.  Id. at 253.  See Report of the 
Special Committee on Administrative Law, 66 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 439 (1941). 
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Jackson transmitted the Acheson Committee’s final report with its recommendations 
to President Roosevelt.129  The Acheson Committee conducted in-depth 
investigations of twenty-seven agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
and the Board of Tax Appeals.130  The Final Report was organized as follows: 
 
Chapter I. The Origins, Development, and Characteristics of the 
Administrative Process; 
Chapter II. Administrative Information; 
Chapter III. Informal Methods of Adjudication; 
Chapter IV. Formal Adjudication: Problems of Organization; 
Chapter V. Formal Adjudication: Problems of Procedure; 
Chapter VI. Judicial Review of Administrative Adjudication; 
Chapter VII. Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making. 
Although the APA, enacted several years later, did not adopt a number of the 
Acheson Committee’s recommendations, it did adopt many of them and one can 
discern the skeletal structure of the APA in the Final Report’s organization.  It is 
significant that nowhere in the Final Report does the Acheson Committee even hint 
that it viewed the BTA as anything other than an administrative agency nor does the 
Final Report recommend that the BTA’s status be altered in any way or that it should 
be exempt from the Final Report’s recommendations.  The Final Report 
acknowledges that the BTA operates in a “judicial” fashion—as do other agencies—
and finds nothing remarkable or unique in the BTA’s function. 
A substantial number of existing administrative agencies represent an 
effort to discharge in a fashion analogous to the judicial a function which 
might have been discharged executively or even legislatively.  Many of 
these, as we have noted in the proceeding paragraph, are concerned with 
disbursing what, in legal theory, have been regarded as benefits.  The 
Patent Office, so far as concerns the issuance of patents, is an early 
illustration.  So also came to be the General Land Office.  The United 
States Employees’ Compensation Commission—so far as concerns 
payment of benefits to Federal employees—is an administrative agency 
doing what Congress formerly did by private acts. . . . Most recently, in 
the field of general social security, Congress in creating the Social 
Security Board and the Railroad Retirement Board directed action by 
adjudication as a matter of course; indeed, establishment of these agencies 
would scarcely have been possible, politically, on any other terms. 
Extension of the rule of law through resort to the administrative 
process is by no means confined to the disbursing of benefits.  In the 
assessment of taxes, for example, the development of an administrative 
procedure through the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Board of Tax 
                                                          
  Although James W. Morris was appointed as Chairman, at the time of the Committee’s 
final report, Dean Acheson was the Chairman and the Committee is oftentimes referred to as 
the Acheson Committee, and the author will follow suit here.  
 
129
 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at iii (1941) (letter from Robert H. Jackson).   
 
130
 Id. at 3-5. 
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Appeals has operated in considerable measure to replace an executive 
procedure.131 
The Final Report directed its attention towards reformation of agency formal 
adjudication processes.  The Acheson Committee noted that there was considerable 
diversity as to how the various agencies conducted formal adjudication and the 
weight attached to the decisions of the agency officials who conducted the hearings.  
Again, the Acheson Committee did not find anything extraordinary in how the BTA 
conducted its hearings or the weight accorded the decisions of its members.  
The methods of hearing and initial decision and the internal 
procedural structure vary from agency to agency.  In general, it has been 
customary to designate hearing officers before whom evidence may be 
adduced—whether they be a board of three or more individuals, or, as is 
more common, a single hearing officer . . . .  These hearing officers have 
been selected in various ways.  Cases coming before the Board of Tax 
Appeals—which has no other duties than to hear and decide cases—and 
the National Mediation Board are heard by single members of the agency 
itself; cases coming before the National Railroad Adjustment Board are 
heard by the full bi-partisan membership of one of the four divisions into 
which the Board is divided by statute. . . . 
No less varied is the weight attached by the several agencies to the 
judgments of those who conduct the hearings.  In most of the agencies the 
person who presides is an adviser with no real power to decide.  In a few 
agencies the hearing officer’s or board’s decision is conclusive unless 
appealed by the parties to the head of the agency or unless the agency 
head itself takes the case up for consideration after initial decision. 132 
The Final Report then went on to note that the Board of Tax Appeals followed the 
latter course with regard to weight.133 
The Acheson Committee made a number of recommendations for improving 
formal agency adjudication to ensure that initial hearings were conducted by an 
official who possessed the power to render a decision and to expedite review of that 
initial decision by agency heads.134  However, the Acheson Committee found that the 
procedures by the BTA—and some other agencies—did not need to be changed 
because the procedures in place were effective.  The Acheson Committee’s 
statement that its recommendations need not be adopted by the BTA was based on 
the fact that the BTA was operating effectively, and not based on some perception 
that the BTA was somehow exempt from recommended agency procedure or was 
not actually an agency. 
                                                          
 
131
 Id. at 12. 
 
132
 Id. at 44. 
 
133
 Id. at 44 n.1 (“This is the formula adopted by the Railroad Retirement Board, the 
Veterans’ Administration, the administration of the grazing statutes by the Department of the 
Interior, the Social Security Board, the Board of Tax Appeals, and cases handled by the 
Bureau of Motor Carriers of the Interstate Commerce Commission.”). 
 
134
 Id. at 45-55. 
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The purpose of the recommendation is, insofar as possible, to fix the 
responsibility for initial determinations in able, highly placed officials 
who have themselves heard the evidence, and to make their 
determinations a significant part of the process of administrative decision.  
Obviously, then, the recommendations do not apply in agencies where the 
heads themselves hear and decide cases.  Agencies like the United States 
Tariff Commission and the National Railroad Adjustment Board are 
therefore altogether excluded, while other agencies which occasionally sit 
en banc are in no wise intended to be precluded from continuing to do so.  
Nor is anything in the Committee’s recommendations intended to affect 
the hearing of cases by one or more, but less than a majority, of the 
members of an agency.  The procedures of the Board of Tax Appeals, for 
example, need not be altered.135 
The Acheson Committee also recommended that agencies employ prehearings in 
order to expedite and simplify formal adjudication and noted that the BTA, along 
with several other agencies such as the Social Security Board and the Civil 
Aeronautics Board, already did so to their advantage.  Again, the Acheson 
Committee did not find this arguably “judicial” function to be a uniquely 
distinguishing feature of the BTA.136 
Finally, the Acheson Committee addressed the issue of what rules of evidence 
should control formal agency adjudication in light of the fact that agencies do not 
use juries and frequently deal with technical issues.  The Final Report recommended 
that Congress permit agencies to employ a more relaxed rule with regard to the 
introduction of evidence, noting that the BTA, like other agencies, did not use the 
same rules of evidence as the courts. 
[I]t is rarely suggested that the older common law rules of evidence for 
jury trials should be imposed upon administrative agencies.  
Congressional sanction has been given to varying degrees of relaxation.  
The Federal Power Commission and the National Labor Relations Board 
are expressly freed from application of “the rules of evidence.”  The 
Board of Tax Appeals must observe only the rules of evidence applicable 
in the courts of the District of Columbia in equity proceedings.137  
The Acheson Committee conducted one of the most thorough and well-respected 
reviews of agency procedure.138  Unfortunately, its recommendations were held in 
abeyance, because of the start of World War II, so that the matter of administrative 
agency reform and enactment of the APA did not occur until 1946.139  It is 
                                                          
 
135
 Id. at 53-54. 
 
136
 Id. at 65-66. 
 
137
 Id. at 70. 
 
138
 See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, Birth Pangs of the Administrative Procedure Act, 10 ADMIN. 
L.J. AM. U. 51 (1996).  “Justice Felix Frankfurter applauded the Final Report . . . as having 
given ‘for the first time . . . a comprehensive and luminous insight into the practices and 
procedures of federal administrative agencies and their relation to the judiciary.’”  Id.  See 
also Editorials, 27 A.B.A. J. 95 (1941) (describing the report as “monumental in character and 
momentous in . . . significance and usefulness”).  
 
139
 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 124, at 248. 
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significant that the Acheson Committee never believed nor recommended that the 
BTA, which had been in existence for more than fifteen years, should be treated as a 
court or somehow in a different manner than other administrative agencies.   
D.  Tax Court of the United States: Independent Administrative Agency 
In 1942, while Congress was considering enactment of the Revenue Act of 
1942,140 the Chairman of the BTA, John Edgar Murdoch, urged Congress to change 
the name of the BTA to the Tax Court of the United States.141  Chairman Murdoch 
supported his request by noting that, although the BTA operated as a judicial body 
with formal procedures, the name designation of “Board of Tax Appeals” confused 
the public who expected the BTA to operate as an agency with informal procedures.  
Further, when riding circuit, BTA members experienced difficulty in arranging for 
suitable hearing rooms in courthouses because court clerks balked at providing space 
to an agency. 
Chairman Murdock contended that difficulties the Board was 
experiencing in obtaining the use of hearing rooms in many of the fifty 
cities in which it held trials could be reduced by simply naming the Board 
a court.  The nature of Board proceedings was judicial and courtrooms 
were the most appropriate sites for trials.  But many providers of court 
space throughout the country were, according to Chairman Murdock, 
reluctant to permit administrative hearings to be carried on in their 
facilities since such hearings were generally informal ones “to which 
large and undesirable crowds [were] attracted” and at which “smoking” 
was permitted.142 
Then Attorney General Francis Biddle strongly opposed the proposal.  He expressed 
his views in his letters to Senator Doughton, Chair of the Senate Finance 
                                                          
In August 1941 the increasingly threatening international situation moved the Senate 
Judiciary Committee to postpone further consideration of the legislative proposals.  
The attack at Pearl Harbor occurred before the year was out.  During the war years 
1942-43 the subject was necessarily in abeyance; but war legislation, administration, 
and congressional investigations brought administrative processes more and more into 
prominence.  In June 1944 new bills were introduced by the chairmen of the Senate 
and House Judiciary Committees . . . and thereafter there was a good deal of 
discussion and activity in and out of the Government with respect to the form such 
legislation should take.  The Attorney General, utilizing some of the staff of his 
former Committee on Administrative Procedure, had a voluminous analysis made of 
the new bill. 
Id.  See also id. at 296, 380. 
 
140
 Rev. Act, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 957 (1942). 
 
141
 Actually, Chairman Murdoch asked that the BTA’s name be changed to the United 
States Tax Court, and much of the correspondence and proposed legislation used that 
nomenclature; however, Commerce Clearing House, which reported tax cases in a reporting 
service entitled “United States Tax Cases,” was concerned that confusion would result if the 
court and the cases shared the same initials.  DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 184.  Therefore, the 
final version of the Revenue Act of 1942 changed the BTA’s name to the Tax Court of the 
United States.  Id.  
 
142
  DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 178. 
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Committee,143 and to Representative George, Chairman of the House Ways and 
Means Committee,144 stating that he did not agree that the BTA was a court “in 
everything but name” and pointed to several Supreme Court decisions in support of 
his position.  For example, in Old Colony Trust v. Commissioner145 the Supreme 
Court had flatly stated that “[t]he Board of Tax Appeals is not a court.  It is an 
executive or administrative board, upon the decision of which the parties are given 
an opportunity to base a petition for review to the courts after the administrative 
inquiry of the Board has been had and decided.”146  In addition, in United States ex 
rel. Girard Co. v. Helvering,147 the Supreme Court had noted that the BTA did not 
have the authority to enforce its decisions—an inherent judicial power—but rather, 
had to turn to the district courts for enforcement.148   
Attorney General Biddle was concerned that the name change was a first step 
towards converting the BTA to an Article III court (which he considered 
unnecessary because the BTA was functioning well as an administrative agency) and 
that even if after the name change the Tax Court of the United States continued to 
function as an agency, the public would be confused or misled into believing that 
they were dealing with a court.149  
Despite Attorney General Biddle’s opposition, the Revenue Act of 1942 changed 
the name of the Board of Tax Appeals to the Tax Court of the United States; its 
members were given the title of judges and the chairman was given the title of Chief 
Judge.150  However, the Tax Court of the United States continued its status as an 
independent agency located in the executive branch.  
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court decided Dobson v. Commissioner151 in 
which the Court made it clear that the BTA and the Tax Court of the United States 
                                                          
 
143
 Id. at 180.  Francis Biddle had been a member of the Acheson Committee, prior to his 
tenure as Attorney General.  
 
144
 Id. at 178. 
 
145
 Old Colony Trust v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
 
146
 Id. at 725.  It should be noted that Justice McReynolds thought that the Court violated 
separation of powers principles by hearing the case.  Justice McReynolds argued that the 
judicial branch was intruding on the authority of the executive branch because the Court was 
deciding a dispute between two executive branch agencies: the BTA and the BIR. 
The Board of Tax Appeals belongs to the executive department of the Government 
and performs administrative functions—the assessment of taxes.  The statute attempts 
to grant a broad appeal to the courts and directs them to reconsider the Board’s 
action—to do or to say what it should have done.  This enjoins the use of executive 
power, not judicial.  
Id. at 731. 
 
147
 United States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540 (1937). 
 
148
 Id. at 542. 
 
149
 DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 180-81. 
 
150
 Rev. Act, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957 (1942).  “The Board shall be known as the 
Tax Court of the United States.”  Id.  
 
151
 Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). 
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were administrative agencies152 whose findings of fact on appeal were entitled to the 
greater level of deference accorded findings of fact by agencies.153  In Dobson, the 
taxpayers sold stock that had lost its value and properly deducted the losses in the 
two years of sale.  Subsequently, the taxpayers successfully brought suit against the 
entity that had sold them the stock; however, by the time the taxpayers received the 
settlement, the statute of limitations had expired for the years in which the taxpayers 
had deducted the losses.154  The Commissioner’s position was that the settlement was 
ordinary income in the year received.155  However, the settlement did not entirely 
                                                          
 
152
 The taxpayers had their deficiencies reviewed by the BTA; however, while the case was 
wending its way through the judicial system, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1942, 
which changed the name of the BTA to the Tax Court of the United States.  In its opinion, the 
United States Supreme Court made no distinction between the two entities with regard to the 
matter under consideration.  See id. 
 
153
 Unless Congress has specified that an appellate court should apply a different standard 
for review of a district court’s finding of fact, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) 
provides that findings of facts made by district courts in civil cases “must not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous.”  A finding of fact is clearly erroneous “when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 
U.S. 364, 395 (1948).  See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 
123 (1969).  In other words, if the district court’s finding is plausible in light of the record 
viewed in its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse the finding even if the court is 
convinced that it would have weighed the evidence differently.   
In contrast, findings of fact by agencies are given more deference by the reviewing court.  
Congress had not yet enacted the APA at the time of the Dobson decision.  However, the 
standards for review set out in section 706 of the APA were based on principles already in 
existence.  See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 93 
(1947).  Unless Congress has specified that the reviewing court should apply a different 
standard, section 
706(2)(E) of the APA provides that for agency adjudication that was conducted in accordance 
with formal procedures (which is usually not the situation), the reviewing court shall set aside 
agency findings that are unsupported by substantial evidence.  The term “substantial 
evidence” is a bit misleading.  Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a finding after reviewing the entire record.  See 
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951). 
Section 706(2)(A) of the APA provides that for informal agency adjudication (which is the 
norm and how the IRS conducts collection due process hearings), the reviewing court shall set 
aside agency findings that are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.  An agency does 
not abuse its discretion when making a finding of fact if there is a rational basis for the 
finding.  See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 
(1977).  Therefore, it is more difficult for a reviewing court to reverse informal agency 
findings of fact than to reverse a district court’s findings. 
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-16 (1971), the U.S. 
Supreme Court determined that if Congress fails to specify which section 706 APA standard 
to apply to review of agency action, the reviewing court should apply section 706(2)(A)—the 
abuse of discretion standard. 
 
154
 Dobson, 320 U.S. at 491.  
 
155
 Id.  
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compensate the taxpayers for the stock’s loss in value, and if the portion of the 
settlement allocable to the prior two years of loss had been added to what the 
taxpayers had received from the stock’s sale at the time, the taxpayers still would 
have suffered a loss.156  Therefore, the taxpayers appealed to the BTA, which held 
that the taxpayers had no taxable gain.157  The Commissioner appealed to the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals which held that the BTA’s position was not supported by 
the applicable statutes or regulations and, that as a matter of law, the BTA was 
wrong.158 
Although the Revenue Act of 1926 empowered the courts of appeals to modify or 
reverse the BTA if its decision was not “in accordance with law,” the United States 
Supreme Court found that the BTA had decided an issue of fact and not an issue of 
law, and the BTA’s findings with regard to issues of fact should be accorded the 
same finality as that accorded to other administrative agencies.159  The Court 
acknowledged that during the BTA’s tenure, the reviewing courts, including the 
Supreme Court itself, had not always “paid the scrupulous deference to the tax laws’ 
admonitions of finality which they have to similar provisions in statutes relating to 
other tribunals.”160  The Court found that this lack of deference to the BTA’s 
findings of fact was not the result of deliberate judicial or legislative policy but, 
rather, resulted from historical peculiarities as to the development of tax 
administration: to wit, (1) jurisdiction to resolve tax disputes resided initially only in 
the district courts, and (2) during the first few years of the BTA’s existence, its 
findings were not final, but were only prima facie evidence at a later trial in the 
district courts.161 
With regard to the first historical peculiarity, the courts of appeals give the 
district courts less deference with regard to its findings of fact than that accorded 
administrative agencies.  However, after the Revenue Act of 1926 empowered 
parties to appeal the BTA’s findings directly to the circuit courts, the courts of 
appeals were receiving tax cases from two different sources: the BTA (deficiency 
determinations) and the district courts (refund cases).  Therefore, it was “more 
difficult to maintain sharp separation of court and administrative functions in tax 
than in other fields.”162  In other words, the courts of appeals tended to review tax 
cases with the same degree of deference regardless of whether the case had 
originated in the BTA—an administrative agency entitled to more deference—or the 
district courts.   
With regard to the second historical peculiarity, the Supreme Court noted that 
oftentimes the legislation that empowers the courts to review agency action also 
                                                          
 
156
 Id. at 491-92. 
 
157
 Id. at 492. 
 
158
 Id.  
 
159
 Id.  The United States Supreme Court noted that the Revenue Act of 1928, § 272 (g), 45 
Stat. 854, provided that the BTA “in redetermining a deficiency in respect of any taxable year 
shall consider such facts with relation to the taxes for other taxable years as may be necessary 
correctly to redetermine the amount of such deficiency.”  Id. at 493.   
 
160
 Id. at 494. 
 
161
 Id. at 495-97. 
 
162
 Id. at 495. 
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contains limitations on the courts’ scope of review.163  Tax administration and the 
BTA did not evolve in this fashion.  As far back as the income tax imposed during 
the Civil War, taxpayers had to pay a disputed tax and then sue for a refund in the 
federal courts.  The Revenue Act of 1913 also had not provided for any 
administrative review of the Bureau’s assessment of liabilities.  It was not until 
1923, when Congress created the BTA, that taxpayers had recourse to an 
independent administrative agency, and, even then, the BTA’s findings of fact were 
not final, but rather, were only prima facie evidence in a later trial.164  Finally, in 
1926—thirteen years after the income tax was first enacted—the BTA became an 
administrative agency whose findings were entitled to the same finality as that of 
other agencies.165  Therefore, between 1913 and 1926, the courts had been given the 
time to develop and establish their own way of thinking about and approaching tax 
issues, and the courts were in the habit of reviewing findings of fact without 
restraint.166 
Nevertheless, in light of the specialized nature of tax combined with the BTA’s 
and Tax Court of the United States’s independence from the Bureau, the Supreme 
Court held that it was highly appropriate that the findings of fact be given the 
deference due an administrative agency.  The Supreme Court emphasized that this is 
required by the goals of consistency, uniformity, and expedition of resolution that 
are the hallmark of agency action.167   
The court is independent, and its neutrality is not clouded by prosecuting 
duties.  Its procedures assure fair hearings.  Its deliberations are evidenced 
by careful opinions. . . . It has established a tradition of freedom from bias 
and pressures.  It deals with a subject that is highly specialized and so 
complex as to be the despair of judges.  It is relatively better staffed for its 
task than is the judiciary. . . . Individual cases are disposed of wholly on 
records publicly made, in adversary proceedings, and the court has no 
responsibility for previous handling.  Tested by every theoretical and 
practical reason for administrative finality, no administrative decisions are 
entitled to higher credit in the courts.  Consideration of uniform and 
expeditious tax administrations require that they be given all credit to 
which they are entitled under the law.168 
E.  Enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act 
In 1946, Congress enacted the APA.169  The APA prescribed procedures for 
agency action and for judicial review of agency action.  The APA can be roughly 
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 Id. at 496. 
 
164
 Id. at 497. 
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 Id.  
 
166
 Id. at 497-98. 
 
167
 Id. at 499. 
 
168
 Id. 
 
169
  Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 
551-99, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2006)). 
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divided into two sections: (1) those specifying the procedures agencies are to use 
when performing their rulemaking or adjudicatory functions, and (2) those 
specifying the standards courts are to employ when reviewing agency action.170  (It is 
important to keep in mind that Congress intended the APA to control agencies and 
courts only in the absence of a more specific statutory structure).171   
Section 2 of the APA defines an “agency” as “each authority of the Government 
of the United States” other than Congress, the courts, or the governments of the 
possessions, Territories, or the District of Columbia.172  One of the issues about 
which Congress had been concerned was the status of the Tax Court of the United 
States (which despite its title remained an administrative agency) and of the 
legislative courts such as the Claims Court—would these entities be considered 
“courts” and hence exempt from the APA’s provisions regarding agency 
adjudication procedures?  The drafters of the APA had originally contemplated that 
most agency adjudication would be formal and would, therefore, be conducted in 
accordance with the trial-type procedures specified in APA sections 554, 556, and 
557.  Congress was concerned that these legislative courts and judicial-type agencies 
continue to act in accordance with the formal procedures already in place for them 
through their specific enabling legislation; and further that these entities continue to 
act in a judicial capacity only and not be forced to engage in prosecutorial or 
investigatory activities.    
Attorney General Tom Clark advised the Senate Judiciary Committee that 
“‘Courts’ includes The Tax Court, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Court 
of Claims, and similar courts.  This act does not apply to their procedure nor affect 
the requirement of resort thereto.”173  Congress was concerned that these judicial 
entities not be deemed agencies under the sections of the APA specifying agency 
adjudicatory procedures because these entities already had procedures in place.   
With regard to judicial review of agency action, section 706 of the APA specifies 
the different standards and scope that courts are to employ when reviewing agency 
action (unless Congress has specified some other standard or scope is to be 
employed instead).  The legislative history explaining when the reviewing court 
should use de novo review actually uses the Tax Court of the United States as an 
example.174  The Bureau was not required to use formal adjudication procedures 
                                                          
 
170
 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-57 (2006) of the APA detail the procedures agencies are to follow for 
rulemaking and formal adjudication; §§ 701-06 govern judicial review. 
 
171
 5 U.S.C. § 703. 
 
172
 5 U.S.C. § 551. 
 
173
 S. DOC. NO. 79-248 (1946) (letter from Att’y Gen. Tom C. Clark), reprinted in 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 224 (1946).  Interestingly, the  
Congressional Record also contains the discussion or address of Mr. Allen Moore, “a 
prominent member of the Colorado bar,” who refers to the Tax Court of the United States as a 
“legislative court” when discussing the APA’s provisions for judicial review of agency action.  
S. DOC. NO. 79-248 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 334 (1946) (“There is an introductory limitation by which there is excluded 
any matter subject to a subsequent trial de novo or judicial review in any legislative court such 
as the Customs Court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Tax Court, or the Court 
of Claims.”). 
 
174
 Id. (report of Senate Judiciary Committee), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 213-14 (1946). 
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when determining a taxpayer’s liability because Bureau determinations with regard 
to tax liability were subject to de novo review before the Tax Court.175  Therefore, it 
would be redundant to require the Bureau of Internal Revenue to hold a formal 
hearing to make findings of fact if the same matter would be heard de novo in the 
Tax Court, which would make its own findings of fact.  The sections of the APA 
regarding formal hearing requirements at the agency level dovetail with the sections 
of the APA regarding judicial review of agency action.     
 Section 10(E) provides for the scope of court review and provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
Reviewing courts are required to decide all relevant questions of law, 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the 
meaning or applicability of any agency action.  They must (A) compel 
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed and (B) hold 
unlawful any action, findings, or conclusions found to be . . . (6) 
unwarranted by the facts so far as the latter are subject to trial de novo.176 
With regard to the sixth category—trial de novo—the Report of the House Judiciary 
Committee specifically referred to the Tax Court of the United States as fitting 
within that category. 
The sixth category, respecting the establishment of facts upon trial de 
novo, would require the reviewing court to determine the facts in any case 
of adjudication not subject to sections 7 and 8 [formal hearing 
requirements] or otherwise required to be reviewed exclusively on the 
record of a statutory agency hearing. . . . [T]he test is whether there has 
been a statutory administrative hearing of the facts which is adequate and 
exclusive for purposes of review.  Thus, adjudications such as tax 
assessments not made upon a statutory administrative hearing and record 
may involve a trial of the facts in The Tax Court or the United States 
district courts.177 
                                                          
 
175
 Id. (Senate Judiciary Print, June 1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 21-22 (1946). 
[Section 5] defines generally the procedure for the administrative adjudication of 
particular cases.  The introductory clause removes from the operation of sections 5, 7, 
and 8 [(the formal adjudication requirements)] all administrative procedures in which 
Congress has not required orders to be made upon a hearing, and the first of the 
further exceptions eliminates matters subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the 
facts de novo in any court. . . . The exception of matters subject to a subsequent trial of 
the law and the facts de novo in any court exempts such matters as the tax functions of 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (which are triable de novo in The Tax Court). 
Id. 
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 SCOPE OF REVIEW, S. DOC. NO. 79-248 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 278 (1946). 
 
177
 S. DOC. NO. 79-248 (1946) (report of House Judiciary Committee), reprinted in 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 279 (1946); see also id. 
(report of the Senate Judiciary Committee), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 214 (1946).  
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In other words, not only was the Tax Court of the United States not exempt from the 
APA but, rather, was used as an example of how section 706(e) of the APA was 
intended to operate.  Further, section 706(e) of the APA also referred to the federal 
district courts regarding tax assessments.  The Tax Court’s recent statement, that the 
above provision is further proof that the Tax Court is exempt from the APA, is not 
entirely logical.  Section 706 of the APA refers to the United States District Courts, 
which hear refund cases de novo.  Despite the fact that district courts also act as trial 
courts hearing matters de novo, such as tax refund suits, the district courts, at times, 
also function as reviewing courts subject to the APA’s procedures.  In fact, section 
702 of the APA refers to the reviewing courts, which is interpreted as meaning the 
district courts.  Yet, no one argues that the district courts are not reviewing courts, 
subject to section 706 of the APA, when performing judicial review of agency 
action. 
Shortly after Congress enacted the APA, the Sixth Circuit, in a series of cases, 
held that the APA enlarged the ability of the appellate court to review factual 
findings made by the Tax Court of the United States despite the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Dobson.  In Lincoln Electric Co. v. Commissioner178 the 
taxpayer sought to deduct as ordinary and necessary business expenses premiums 
paid on employees’ retirement annuity policies and employees’ trust funds.179  The 
Internal Revenue Service had disallowed the deductions, and the Tax Court of the 
United States sustained that position.180  On appeal, the Internal Revenue Service 
argued that whether the payments were ordinary and necessary business expenses 
was an issue of fact, and, that as long as the Tax Court of the United States’ position 
had any substantial basis in the evidence, the Sixth Circuit was bound to uphold the 
Tax Court’s position under Dobson.181  In contrast, the taxpayer argued that the Sixth 
Circuit could review the Tax Court’s factual findings because the recently-enacted 
APA rendered Dobson obsolete.182  The Internal Revenue Service argued that the 
taxpayer was mistaken as to the applicability of the APA because the Act 
specifically exempts courts, and, according to the Attorney General, the Tax Court of 
the United States would be considered a court for purposes of applying the Act.183 
The Sixth Circuit held that the deductibility of the premiums was an issue of law, 
not fact,184 but went on to state that, despite the Attorney General’s position, the Tax 
Court of the United States was an agency, and that the APA had expanded the Sixth 
Circuit’s powers of review with regard to issues of fact. 
The Board of Tax Appeals was, however, by the language of the 
statute creating it . . . an independent agency in the executive branch of 
the government.  It was so held in Old Colony v. Com’r . . . .  When by § 
504(a) of the Revenue Act of 1942, its name was changed to the Tax 
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 Lincoln Electric Co. v. Comm’r, 162 F.2d 379 (6th Cir. 1947).  
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 Id. at 379-80. 
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 Id. at 379. 
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 Id. at 381. 
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 Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 38 (1945). 
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 Lincoln Electric Co., 162 F.2d at 383. 
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Court of the United States, the Act expressly provided: ‘the jurisdiction, 
powers, and duties of the The Tax Court shall be the same as by existing 
law provided in the case of the Board of Tax Appeals.’ . . . When the 
Supreme Court came to consider, in Com’r v. Gooch Milling & Elevator 
Co. . . . the jurisdiction of the Board of Tax Appeals to order a refund or 
credit a prior overpayment against a deficiency, it concluded that the 
Board possessed no power to grant equitable recoupment as did tribunals 
having general equity jurisdiction, for the Board . . . is but an independent 
agency in the Executive Branch of the Government.  That case was 
decided in December, 1943, after the Board of Tax Appeals had become 
the Tax Court of the United States. . . . While our conclusion is that 
review of Tax Court decisions is governed by the Administrative 
Procedures Act, it does not become necessary, in view of our reliance 
upon the Bingham case, to particularize in what respect our power to 
review has been enlarged, except to say that it doubtless has been 
broadened and that it will be time enough to consider the precise 
application of the Act when clear-cut questions of fact or mixed questions 
of fact and law are brought to us for review.185 
In two subsequent cases, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its position that it could review 
the Tax Court of the United States under the standards set forth in the APA.186 
In 1948, Congress changed the standard under which appellate courts would 
review Tax Court of the United States’ decisions, thereby effectively overruling 
Dobson.  Henceforth, appellate courts’ scope of review would be the same as appeals 
from district courts’ decisions tried without a jury.187 
F.  United States Tax Court 
From 1943 to 1967, Congress considered changing the Tax Court of the United 
States’ status from an agency in the executive branch to an Article III court.188  
Proponents of the change argued that Article III status would finally resolve and 
remove the confusion that periodically had cropped up as to the application of the 
APA to the Tax Court of the United States.  Further, Article III status would give the 
court more prestige and attract highly qualified persons to serve, although both the 
BTA and the Tax Court of the United States were highly regarded.189   
                                                          
 
185
 Id. at 382 (quotations omitted). 
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 See Dawson v. Comm’r, 163 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1947); Lawton v. Comm’r, 164 F.2d 
380 (6th Cir. 1947).  
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 Housing and Rent Act of 1948, ch. 646, § 36, 62 Stat. 99 (codified at I.R.C. § 7482 
(2006)); see Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why 
Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions Is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REV. 235, 
236 (1998) (considering whether, as a practical matter, the appellate courts still follow Dobson 
and why heightened deference is undesirable). 
 
188
 See A Proposal to Give the Tax Court Article III Status: Hearings on S. 2041 Before the 
S. Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th 
Cong. 13-19 (1968) (describing the history of the Tax Court and containing a chronology of 
the legislation introduced since 1924 to change the status of the Tax Court to an Article III 
court). 
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 DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 206. 
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However, the proposed change encountered substantial opposition from several 
quarters.  If the Tax Court of the United States became an Article III court, it no 
longer would be under the jurisdiction of the House Means and Way Committee and 
the Senate Finance Committee, but instead, would be under the authority of the 
House and Senate Judiciary Committees leading to turf wars between congressional 
members.  The Department of Treasury was opposed because of its concern that the 
Department of Justice would take over the task of representing the United States 
before the Article III court instead of the attorneys from the Office of Chief Counsel 
in the Internal Revenue Service.190  Taxpayer representatives were opposed out of 
concerns that accountants would no longer be permitted to represent taxpayers 
before the Article III court.  (Accountants represented taxpayers more often back 
then).  Finally, the United States Judicial Conference opposed the change on the 
ground that it was inappropriate for a judge in a court of such specialized jurisdiction 
to have Article III status.   
As a last minute compromise, the Tax Reform Act of 1969191 was amended, and 
the Tax Court of the United States was changed from an independent agency to a 
legislative court entitled “The United States Tax Court” (Tax Court) created under 
Article I of the Constitution.192  In order to further assure taxpayers of the Tax 
Court’s independence from the IRS and the Treasury Department, Congress also 
provided funds for the construction of a new courthouse in which to house the Tax 
Court.   
After the Tax Court became a legislative court, Chief Judge William F. Drennen 
issued an order that the Tax Court’s notices, orders, rules, and other public 
documents were no longer subject to the APA’s requirements that such items be 
published in the Federal Registrar and also ordered that the Code of Federal 
Regulations delete provisions dealing with the Tax Court (because the Tax Court 
was no longer an agency).193 
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 Usually, the Department of Justice represents the United States in court and does so in 
tax refund cases in District Court and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims; however, the 
Department of Treasury (Office of Chief Counsel in the Internal Revenue Service) has always 
represented the government in cases heard in the BTA, the Tax Court of the United States, and 
the United States Tax Court.  This dichotomy arose because taxpayer appeals initially were 
heard by the Committee on Appeals and Review, which was part of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue, and was an informal process conducted between the taxpayer, the Committee, and 
the Bureau’s representatives. See Johnson, supra note 187, at 242 n.31 (providing a more 
detailed explanation as to the government’s representation on tax matters before the various 
courts, including the bankruptcy courts). 
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 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730 (amending I.R.C. § 
7441 (1954)). 
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 See Fahey, supra note 22, at 479-80. 
 
193
 Tax Court of the United States: Deletion of Chapter, 35 Fed. Reg. 12462 (1970).   
  Whereas the Tax Reform Act of 1969 . . . amending section 7441 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, established the U.S. Tax Court as a court of record under article I of 
the Constitution of the United States; and 
  Whereas, publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER of the Court’s public notices, orders, 
rules, and other public documents is no longer within the purview of the 
Administrative Procedure Act: 
  Now, therefore, the material appearing under Chapter II, Title 26 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, is deleted, and the codification determinations assigned to the 
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Shortly after becoming an Article I court, the Tax Court decided Nappi v. 
Commissioner194 wherein the Tax Court stated that “since the United States Tax 
Court is a court of record established under Article I of the Constitution of the 
United States, the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are not applicable 
to Tax Court procedures or jurisdiction.”195  The taxpayer had received a notice of 
deficiency from the IRS but had failed to file his petition with the Tax Court within 
the ninety-day period required for the Tax Court to be able to exercise jurisdiction 
over the petition.196  The taxpayer argued that, nevertheless, the Tax Court could 
exercise jurisdiction because “the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are 
controlling in this situation and supplant the requirements of section 6213(a), so as to 
confer jurisdiction on the Tax Court to hear and decide this income tax 
controversy.”197  Although it is not entirely clear from the opinion, it appears that the 
taxpayer was endeavoring to use sections 702, 703, and 704 of the APA to argue that 
the Tax Court could exercise jurisdiction.198 
The Tax Court could have—and should have—reasoned that because Congress 
had already prescribed when and how the Tax Court could acquire jurisdiction over a 
                                                          
Court in its former status under the executive branch of the Government are 
relinquished. 
  This action is effective upon publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER. 
Id. 
 
194
 Nappi v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 282 (1972). 
 
195
 Id. at 282. 
 
196
 Id. at 283; I.R.C. §§ 6213(a), 7502 (1954) (providing that the petition must be filed 
within ninety days).  
 
197
 Nappi, 58 T.C. at 283. 
 
198
 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) provides that a person who is seeking relief from agency action 
may seek judicial review. 
 A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof.  An action in a court of the United States 
seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an 
officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under 
color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the 
ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an 
indispensable party. 
Id.  
  5 U.S.C. § 703 provides that “[t]he form of proceeding for judicial review is the special 
statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in 
the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action . . . in a court of 
competent jurisdiction.”  A “court of competent jurisdiction” usually refers to the district 
courts but because the “special statutory review proceeding” here—I.R.C. §6213(a) provides 
that the Tax Court should hear the matter, and the Tax Court would be the appropriate court. 
  5 U.S.C. § 704 provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final 
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial 
review.” 
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deficiency proceeding, the APA’s provisions were inapposite.  Instead, the Tax 
Court argued that the APA’s provisions apply to an “agency” of the Government, but 
specifically exclude “the courts of the United States,”199 and, because the Tax Court 
was an Article I court, the APA did not apply to the Tax Court.  However, the APA 
provisions to which the Tax Court referred are those contained in sections 551 
through 559, which control agency adjudication and rulemaking and not judicial 
review by the courts.  It is true that because the Tax Court was a court it was not 
subject to those APA provisions that dictate how, in the absence of other 
Congressional direction, an agency should perform rulemaking or formal 
adjudication.  However, the APA’s provisions regarding judicial review contained in 
sections 701 through 706 apply to courts in the absence of Congressional directive 
regarding the conduct of judicial review of agency action.  Therefore, the reason that 
the taxpayer could not invoke the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over his deficiency 
petition was because he had failed to comply with the statutorily-mandated process 
for doing so200 and not because the APA could not apply to the Tax Court. 
In addition, the Tax Court referred to prior case law in support of its position:  
O’Dwyer v. Commissioner,201 Anderson v. Commissioner,202 and Kennedy Name 
Plate Co. v. Commissioner,203 stating that these cases held “that the Administrative 
Procedure Act did not apply to the Tax Court before the Tax Reform Act of 1969.”204  
However, that is an overly broad reading of those three cases, and they did not 
specifically hold that the APA did not apply to the Tax Court.  Indeed, in Kennedy 
Name Plate Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that the APA 
might well apply at times.205  The Ninth Circuit also held that the taxpayer was not 
entitled to a hearing before the entire panel of the Tax Court of the United States 
because its enabling legislation permitted one judge to hear and dispose of a 
matter.206  With regard to Anderson, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had 
                                                          
 
199
 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). 
 
200
 I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2006). 
 
201
 O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1959). 
 
202
 Anderson v. Comm’r, 164 F.2d 870 (7th Cir. 1947). 
 
203
 Kennedy Name Plate Co. v. Comm’r, 170 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1948).   
 
204
 Nappi, 58 T.C. at 284. 
 
205
 Kennedy Name Plate Co., 170 F.2d at 198. 
 
206
 Id. at 198-99.  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the APA specifically states that it does 
not repeal specific grants of authority.  Congress specifically provided that the entire panel of 
the Tax Court of the United States need not decide a case.  Again, it is significant to note that 
the Ninth Circuit did not say that the APA does not apply to the Tax Court of the United 
States but, rather, that the APA itself authorized the use of a different procedure. 
To begin with it is to be observed that Sec. 2 of the Act, after defining the term 
“agency,” provides that “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to repeal delegations 
of authority as provided by law.”  Turning to the statute relating to the organization 
and procedure of the Tax Court, we note a provision authorizing the presiding judge to 
divide the Court into divisions of one or more members.  Section 1118(a) of 26 
U.S.C.A. provides that “A division shall hear, and make a determination upon, any 
proceeding instituted before the Tax Court and any motion in connection therewith, 
assigned to such division by the presiding judge, and shall make a report of any such 
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simply held that it did not matter whether it reviewed the “whole record,” as 
provided in APA section 706, because substantial evidence supported the Tax Court 
of the United States’ determination under any standard.207  
In O’Dwyer, the Fourth Circuit affirmed that when the Tax Court conducts 
deficiency hearings, it is a trial court hearing evidence de novo and is not confined to 
the record compiled by the IRS during its administrative proceedings.208  Therefore, 
O’Dwyer fails to shed light on the standards governing the Tax Court when it 
conducts collection due process hearings or other review of agency action. 
In O’Dwyer, the IRS contended that the husband and wife taxpayers had failed to 
include certain items in gross income.  William O’Dwyer had been the mayor of 
New York from 1945 to 1950, after which time he served as ambassador to 
Mexico.209  The IRS determined that when he was running for re-election as mayor 
in 1949, William O’Dwyer had received $10,000 from the Uniformed Firemen’s 
Association, ostensibly as a campaign contribution.210  In fact, the evidence indicated 
that Mr. O’Dwyer received the $10,000 for his personal use.211  The IRS also 
determined that while Mr. O’Dwyer was ambassador to Mexico, his wife, Sloan 
O’Dwyer, had deposited $1,500 into a personal bank account, the source of which 
funds she could not satisfactorily explain.212   
The O’Dwyers appealed the IRS’s deficiency determination to the Tax Court of 
the United States, which, after making some adjustments to the amount due to allow 
for some deductions, upheld the IRS’s deficiency determination.213  The Tax Court 
also refused to enforce two subpoenas duce tecum that the O’Dwyers had managed 
to procure, which required the IRS to turn over the revenue agents’ reports.  Revenue 
agents’ reports are confidential files compiled by the revenue agents during the 
course of investigating a taxpayer’s deficiency.214  The O’Dwyers argued that the 
                                                          
determination which constitutes its final disposition of the proceeding.”  (Emphasis 
supplied.)  By subdivision (b) of the same section the report of the division becomes 
the report of the Tax Court within thirty days after such report, “unless within such 
period the presiding judge has directed that such report shall be reviewed by the Tax 
Court.” 
  The comparable provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, as found in Sec. 7 
thereof, states that “nothing in this Act shall be deemed to supersede the conduct of 
specified classes of proceedings in whole or in part by or before boards or other 
officers specially provided for by or designated pursuant to statute.” 
  We conclude that the relevant procedure of the Tax Court, as prescribed specifically 
by law, and as followed here, is not affected by the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 
207
 Anderson, 164 F.2d at 874. 
 
208
 O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1959). 
 
209
 Id. at 578. 
 
210
 Id. at 583. 
 
211
 Id.  
 
212
 Id. at 588. 
 
213
 Id. at 577. 
 
214
 SALTZMAN, supra note 28. 
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revenue agent reports were part of the IRS record, and, therefore, the Tax Court was 
obligated to consider those reports according to section 706 of the APA; however, 
the Tax Court disagreed.   
This Court is not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act.  We do not 
review in the same sense as other courts perhaps review actions of the 
Federal Communications Commission or some other federal agency.  We 
do not review in that same manner the determinations of the 
Commissioner.  This is a trial ‘de novo’ and the question before me is 
simply whether or not the deficiencies determined by the Commissioner 
are correct.215 
The O’Dwyers appealed, and among their contentions was that the Tax Court had 
erred in refusing to enforce the two subpoenas duce tecum because the APA required 
the IRS to turn over these reports to the taxpayers and the Tax Court for its review 
when rendering its decision.216  The O’Dwyers argued that the IRS’s determination 
was subject to judicial review in accordance with section 706 of the APA, that the 
Tax Court was a reviewing court subject to the provisions of section 706, and that 
section 706 requires the Tax Court to review the “whole record” upon which the IRS 
based its determination, which would include the revenue agents’ reports.217 
The Fourth Circuit held that the O’Dwyers had misinterpreted the APA.  When 
Congress requires an agency to hold a hearing in accordance with sections 554 
through 557 of the APA, the agency must employ formal, trial-type procedures and 
create a formal record, which includes all the testimony and other evidence that the 
parties presented and on which the agency based its decision.218  If either party 
appeals, the reviewing court must confine its review to that formal record and cannot 
consider other evidence.219  However, the IRS was not (and is not) subject to sections 
554 through 557 of the APA when dealing with taxpayers.220   
The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act must be read and 
construed together and we hold that the judicial review of the ‘whole 
record’ mentioned in section [706(e)] envisages, in the case of 
adjudication, a review of the record made in cases wherein Sections [554, 
556, and 557] are applicable.  Where these sections apply, the 
administrative agency is required to hold a formal hearing within a strict 
statutory framework and to make up a record of the testimony and 
exhibits introduced thereat, upon which record the agency must base its 
decision.  This formal record is the subject of the review provided in Sec. 
[706].  To hold that Sec. [706] applies to a determination of the 
Commissioner and that the Tax Court is a ‘reviewing court’, within the 
meaning of that section, would be to hold that such determination is 
                                                          
 
215
 O’Dwyer, 266 F.2d at 579.  
 
216
 Id. at 578-79. 
 
217
 Id. at 580. 
 
218
 Id.  
 
219
 Id. 
 
220
 Cohen v. Comm’r, 176 F.2d 394, 397 (10th Cir. 1949).   
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subject to the rigid requirements of Secs. [554, 556, and 557].  Without a 
‘record’ to review, the provisions of Sec. [706] would be meaningless and 
thus inapplicable here. 
It has been held that the Bureau of Internal Revenue is exempt from 
the requirements of Secs. [554, 556, and 557] of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  The Tax Court is given jurisdiction to redetermine the 
deficiency asserted by the Commissioner, and in doing so it is empowered 
to prescribe rules of practice and procedure and is required to apply the 
rules of evidence applicable to nonjury trials in the United States Court of 
the District of Columbia and make findings of fact upon such evidence.  
The Tax Court thus renders its decision only upon the evidence produced 
before it. . . .  
The Tax Court, rather than being a ‘reviewing court’, within the 
meaning of Sec. [706] reviewing the ‘record’, is a court in which the facts 
are triable de novo and the burden is upon the taxpayer to come forward 
with evidence showing the determination of deficiency to be erroneous.  
We agree that the Tax Court is not subject to the Administrative 
Procedure Act.221 
IV.  SPECIALIZED COURT STATUS AND THE APA 
A.  Article I v. Article III Courts: The Distinction 
The mere fact that the Tax Court and the district courts are not in harmony as to 
the applicability of the APA to collection due process appeals is not a sufficient 
justification for imposing the APA on the Tax Court.  A taxpayer arguing a 
deficiency before the Tax Court does not have the matter heard in accordance with 
the same procedures and rights as a taxpayer arguing a refund before the district 
court.222  This discrepancy has been upheld by the courts, which recognize that 
deficiency hearings and refund hearings serve different purposes and spring from 
different statutory schemes.  Collection due process appeals, however, do arise from 
a common statutory root: I.R.C. section 6330.  There is nothing in the statute itself, 
nor its legislative history, to indicate that Congress intended or anticipated that there 
would be any difference in how the appeals were conducted, whether before the Tax 
Court or the district court.     
One then must consider whether the Tax Court’s Article I status, or the fact that 
it is a court of specialized jurisdiction, renders the APA inapplicable; that is to say, 
one must ask if there is something about the nature of an Article I or a specialized 
Article III court that makes it inappropriate for the APA to apply. 
Article III of the Constitution states that the “judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish.”223  The Justices of the Supreme Court 
and the inferior federal courts “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and 
shall . . . receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished 
                                                          
 
221
 O’Dwyer, 266 F.2d at 580 (citations omitted). 
 
222
 Id. 
 
223
 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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during their Continuance in Office.”224  It is important to note that, although the 
Constitution does not obligate Congress to create inferior federal tribunals, the 
Constitution demands that if Congress chooses to do so, the judges must have their 
salary and tenure protected.225   
Read literally, Article III appears to require that the judicial power must reside 
only in federal tribunals whose judges must enjoy tenure and salary protection.  
However, even the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that Article III 
would be interpreted so narrowly.226  For example, the first Congress enacted 
legislation authorizing the executive branch to resolve disputes involving claims to 
veterans’ benefits and customs duties.227   
From time to time Congress has created courts to hear specific matters and whose 
judges sit for fixed terms, and they do not enjoy salary and tenure protection.  
Congress usually creates these non-Article III tribunals pursuant to one of its 
enumerated powers under Article I of the Constitution together with the necessary 
and proper clause contained therein.228  These federal courts are referred to as 
legislative courts or Article I courts.  The United States Tax Court is an Article I 
court, as is the United States Court for Federal Claims.229  As far back as 1828, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the use of non-Article III tribunals under 
                                                          
 
224
 Id. 
 
225
 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 1.1–1.4.6. (3d ed. 1999) 
(explaining Article III’s provisions and the early history of the federal courts). 
 
226
 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article 
III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 916, 919-21 (1988).  Professor Fallon posits that there are three 
problems with literalism: (1) The early history indicates that Congress did not construe Article 
III literally.  The first Congress vested power in the executive to hear disputes regarding 
customs and veterans’ benefits.  (2) Literalism raises policy concerns in our modern 
administrative state.  At the time the Constitution was adopted, the federal government was 
very limited in its functions.  However, our modern government has created entitlements and 
assumed responsibility for enforcing a broader range of legal rights.  Literalism would 
frustrate these interests that Congress has sought to advance through the use of non-Article III 
tribunals.  (3) A literal reading of Article III is incompatible with, and would lead to the 
rejection of, an enormous amount of case law and current practice (although stare decisis is 
entitled to less deference with regard to constitutional issues).  Id. 
 
227
 See, e.g., Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95 (military benefits); see Act of Sept. 1, 
1789, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55 (customs duties). 
 
228
 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1-18.  Although non-Article III tribunals are created 
pursuant to Congress’s enumerated powers under Article I, this is not always the case.  Id.  
For example, territorial courts are created pursuant to Congress’s power under Article IV, 
section 3 of the Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 
229
 Other Article I courts include the Court of Private Land Claims created by Congress in 
1891 to resolve claims to land based on Spanish and Mexican grants to land later ceded to the 
United States from Mexico.  Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 539, 26 Stat. 854.  The Choctaw and 
Chickasaw Citizenship Courts were designed to resolve claims to membership in the tribes, 
which would affect the right to previously allocated lands and funds.  Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 
641, 32 Stat. 641.  See Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 
AM. U. L. REV. 1003 (1991). 
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certain circumstances.  In American Insurance Co. v. 365 Bales of Cotton,230 the 
United States Supreme Court considered the constitutional status of a court created 
for the territory of Florida, which was not yet a state.  Chief Justice Marshall, who 
wrote the opinion, held that Congress had the power to create non-Article III courts 
and upheld the constitutionality of the territorial court.   
These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts . . . .  They are legislative 
Courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in 
the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to 
make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging 
to the United States.231 
Article I courts function as courts in their application of law to facts in order to 
render opinions; however, they do not have “inherent powers” but only such powers 
as are given to them by statute.232  They are courts of specialized, as opposed to 
general jurisdiction such as the federal district courts.233  
However, not all courts created under Article III of the United States Constitution 
have general subject matter jurisdiction.  Congress has created a number of Article 
III courts that have specialized jurisdiction.  For example, in 1956, Congress 
established the Court of International Trade as an Article III court.234  The Court of 
International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over case disputes between the federal 
government and private citizens with regard to import transactions.235  In 1978, 
Congress created both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign 
Surveillance Court of Review.236  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is 
empowered to hear applications for orders approving electronic surveillance to 
gather foreign intelligence information.  It is staffed by district court judges who take 
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 Am. Ins. Co. v. 365 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828).   
 
231
 Id. at 546.  See also Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax 
Court’s Exercise of Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 357, 363 (2001).  
Professor Lederman notes that it is arguable that the United States Supreme Court recognized 
the legitimacy of legislative courts even earlier in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 162 
(1803), where the Court recognizes the right of William Marbury to his five-year term as a 
Justice of Peace for the District of Columbia, thereby allowing the exercise of judicial power 
without life tenure.  Lederman, supra, at 363.  
 
232
 Lederman, supra note 231, at 369 n.61 (citing in support In re Hessinger & Assocs., 192 
B.R. 211, 215 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Because the bankruptcy courts are creatures of Article I, 
they have no ‘inherent’ powers and their jurisdiction is limited to that expressly granted by 
Congress.”). 
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 In 1875, Congress authorized the federal district courts to hear cases arising under the 
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.  Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 
470.  This grant of general federal question jurisdiction is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).  
 
234
 Act of July 14, 1956, ch. 589, 70 Stat. 532.  The Court of International Trade is the 
successor to the Board of General Appraisers, which was created to reduce the district courts 
and also to promote uniformity in customs cases.  In 1926, the Board’s name was changed to 
the United States Customs Court.  Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, 44 Stat. 669.     
 
235
 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-85. 
 
236
 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11). 
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turns sitting on the court located in the District of Columbia.  The Foreign 
Surveillance Court of Review hears appeals from the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court and is staffed by three appellate court judges, who sit for terms.237  
The Emergency Court of Appeals was established in 1942 to review regulations and 
orders issued by the Office of Price Administration.238  The Office of Price 
Administration and the Emergency Court of Appeals were designed to control rising 
domestic prices after the United States entered World War II.  The Emergency Court 
of Appeals was terminated in 1961.   
The Tax Court is not a court created by Congress under Article III of the United 
States Constitution.239  Rather, the Tax Court is a specialized court created by 
Congress pursuant to one of its powers enumerated in Article I of the United States 
Constitution240 and the necessary and proper clause also contained therein.241  
Because the Tax Court is a legislative or Article I court, it “is a court of limited 
jurisdiction, and . . . may exercise . . . jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by 
Congress.”242   
B.  Specialized Courts Subject to the APA 
Congress, when empowering an Article I or specialized Article III court, will 
provide in the enabling legislation what authority and powers the courts may 
exercise.  This makes sense; after all, the very purpose of an Article I court or a 
specialized Article III court is to hear a particular matter such as tariff disputes or 
contract claims against the government.  However, if the Article I or specialized 
Article III court is acting as a reviewing court, and if a special statutory proceeding 
does not exist or the special statutory proceeding is inadequate, the APA can and 
should function as a gap-filler.243  The Supreme Court has not found any 
constitutional or statutory impediment to an Article I or specialized Article III court 
turning to the APA, and, in fact, the Supreme Court has held that the federal courts 
must turn to the APA if Congress has not specified otherwise. 
In Dickinson v. Zurko,244 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a specialized Article III court, which had reviewed 
factual findings of the Patent and Trademark Office’s under a “clearly erroneous 
standard.”  The clearly erroneous standard is a more stringent review standard than 
the APA’s substantial evidence standard, which is used to review formal agency 
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 See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, Apr. 2, 1990, at 187-89. 
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 Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 31, 56 Stat. 23, amended by Inflation Control Act of 1942, ch. 
578, 56 Stat. 765.   
 
239
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 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  See discussion supra Part III.F. 
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 Meyer v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 417, 420 (2000) (citing I.R.C. § 7442; Judge v. Comm’r, 
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 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
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adjudications.245  The Supreme Court held that “a reviewing court must apply the 
APA’s court/agency review standards in the absence of an exception.”246  The 
Supreme Court noted that to hold otherwise would frustrate the purposes of the 
APA, which was to bring consistency to the conduct of judicial review. 
Recognizing the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to 
judicial review of administrative action, see, e.g., Universal Camera 
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); 92 
Cong. Rec. 5654 (1946) (statement of Rep. Walter), we have closely 
examined the Federal Circuit’s claim for an exception to that uniformity.  
In doing so, we believe that respondents must show more than a 
possibility of a heightened standard, and indeed more than even a bare 
preponderance of evidence in their favor.  Existence of the additional 
requirement must be clear.  This is suggested both by the phrase 
“recognized by law” and by the congressional specification in the APA 
that “[n]o subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the 
provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so 
expressly.” § 12, 60 Stat. 244, 5 U.S.C. § 559.  A statutory intent that 
legislative departure from the norm must be clear suggests a need for 
similar clarity in respect to grandfathered common-law variations.  The 
APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and 
diversity.  It would frustrate that purpose to permit divergence on the 
basis of a requirement “recognized” only as ambiguous.247  
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals, a predecessor to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,248 had 
used a heightened court/court standard of review prior to the enactment of the APA.  
The Supreme Court found that, in fact, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had 
used the more deferential court/agency substantial evidence standard, not the 
heightened clearly erroneous standard.  It is significant that the Supreme Court did 
not make mention, or even consider if there were, any constitutional or statutory 
impediment to subjecting these courts to the APA.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Commentators and several federal courts of appeals have argued that the Tax 
Court should fill in the gaps in its statutory authority for collection due process 
appeals by turning to traditional administrative law jurisprudence, including the 
APA.  Doing so would promote consistency and predictability to the Tax Court’s 
judicial review of the IRS’s collection due process hearings, thus rendering the 
process fairer for all of the participants.  By adhering to traditional administrative 
law jurisprudence and the strictures of the APA, the Tax Court would be acting in 
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 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). 
 
246
 Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 154. 
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 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals at various times was deemed by the Supreme 
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accordance with the values this body of law is designed to implement: uniformity in 
procedure.  Further, a review of the Tax Court’s and the APA’s history reveals that 
the Tax Court and its predecessors were not exceptions to the APA’s requirements 
but, rather, they were consistently viewed as within the APA’s purview. 
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